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This report reviews current knowledge about prejudice: what it is, how it might be 
measured and how it might be reduced. It focuses specifically on the equality groups 
set out in the Equality Act 2006: groups which share a common attribute in respect of 
age, disability, gender, race, religion or belief, or sexual orientation. 
 
The nature of prejudice 
Prejudice is defined in this report as ‘bias which devalues people because of their 
perceived membership of a social group’. 
 
The social psychology literature highlights four areas that we need to understand: 
 
1. The intergroup context   
This refers to the ways that people in different social groups view members of other 
groups. Their views may relate to power differences, the precise nature of 
differences, and whether group members feel threatened by others. These 
intergroup perceptions provide the context within which people develop their 
attitudes and prejudices. 
 
2. The psychological bases for prejudice  
These include: people’s key values; the ways they see themselves and others; their 
sense of social identity, and social norms that define who is included in or excluded 
from social groups. 
 
Prejudice is more likely to develop and persist where: 
 
• groups have different or conflicting key values 
• others are seen as different 
• people see their identity in terms of belonging to particular groups, and 
• their groups discriminate against others. 
 
3. Manifestations of prejudice  
There are many ways in which prejudice can be expressed. Stereotypes can be 
positive or negative, and may be linked to a fear that other groups may pose a 
threat. Some apparently positive stereotypes (as sometimes expressed towards 
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Different stereotypes evoke different emotional responses. These include derogatory 
attitudes or overt hostility. People’s use of language, behaviour, emotional reactions 
and media images can all reflect prejudice too. 
 
4. The effect of experience  
This has several dimensions. First, people’s experiences do not always match 
others’ views about the extent of prejudice. For instance, few people express 
negative prejudice towards older people, yet older people report high levels of 
prejudice towards them.  
 
Secondly, contact between groups is likely to increase mutual understanding,  
though it needs to be close and meaningful contact. 
 
A third factor is the extent to which people wish to avoid being prejudiced. This is 
based on personal values, a wish to avoid disapproval, and wider social norms.  
Each of these offers a means for potentially preventing the expression of prejudice 
and discriminatory behaviour. 
 
Measuring prejudice 
Surveys in the UK provide examples of questions that examine various aspects of 
the components of prejudice. However, questions have not been developed for all 
those components. The available questions display both strengths and weaknesses. 
Questions relating to equality strands have generally been fielded in relation to one 
or perhaps two strands: seldom in relation to all. 
 
Ways of reducing prejudice 
Given that contact between different groups is linked to increased understanding,  
the development of relationships, particularly between individuals, offers one means 
of reducing prejudice. 
 
Using the media to reduce prejudice, for its part, requires extreme care. Evidence 
about the effectiveness of media campaigns is limited, and there is a danger that 
attempts to reduce prejudice can backfire. 
 
Prejudice can start in childhood. Gender bias begins earlier than, say, prejudice 
linked to nationality, but the latter then both persists and develops. Work with 
children can help them understand differences and similarities between groups,  






The promotion of good relations more generally may help to tackle prejudice,  
but prejudice and good relations need to be understood and dealt with as  
distinct aspects of social harmony. This requires further research. 
 
Conclusions 
We need a comprehensive national picture of prejudice towards all equality  
groups. This will help us to understand the nature and extent of prejudice  
and provide a baseline against which to measure change. Having appropriate 
measurement tools will also enable us to establish whether policies to reduce 
prejudice are having the desired effect. 
 
Not least, we need more information about the most effective practical  
interventions to reduce prejudice. This should involve the rigorous evaluation  
of a range of interventions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1  Context 
Prejudice and discrimination can affect people’s opportunities, their social  
resources, self-worth and motivation, and their engagement with wider society. 
Moreover, perceptions of equality and inequality are themselves drivers of further 
discrimination. Consequently, establishing, promoting and sustaining equality and 
human rights depends on understanding how people make sense of and apply these 
concepts in their everyday lives.  
 
Structural inequalities pervade society, and map onto differences in social class, 
ethnicity and socioeconomic categorisations. To some extent legislation and the 
direct provision of services and resources can redress such inequalities, but they 
cannot on their own deal with embedded social attitudes that give rise, whether 
deliberately or otherwise, to discrimination. Moreover, structural interventions usually 
apply to particular groups or categories (as in the case of ‘failing schools’, or entry 
criteria to Oxbridge from the state sector) but potentially ignore other axes of 
inequality. Indeed, new social categorisations constantly arise. For example, 
politicians and the media regularly identify new alleged threats from, for instance, 
immigrants of particular types, particular practices adopted by religions, threats to 
‘institutions’ such as marriage, and so on. Consequently, the targets of prejudice and 
discrimination may change faster than legislation can possibly respond.  
 
If prejudice and discrimination are to be addressed, it is essential to provide a wider 
analysis of the ways that they arise as general social processes. This review sets out 
a framework informed largely by a social psychological perspective which identifies 
the elements that can increase or reduce prejudice or harmony between members of 
different groups. This framework identifies factors that affect and are affected by 
people’s beliefs, stereotypes, emotions and attitudes towards their own and other 
groups in society. The framework can then be used to interpret any particular 
intergroup division (or alliance) and allow a systematic understanding of the way 
different interventions and courses of action will affect those relationships. This wider 
analysis also points to ways that society can be prepared for greater complexity in 
terms of the cultural and other group memberships that frame people’s relationships. 
 
The purpose of this review is to establish a cross-strand framework for 
understanding the causes, manifestations and ways of tackling prejudice and 





1.2  Structure of the report 
This report comprises four sections.  
 
This first section sets out the terms of reference for the review and explains  
how ‘prejudice’ and ‘good relations’ can and should be distinguished. Reducing 
prejudice does not guarantee good relations, and improving good relations may not 
necessarily prevent prejudice or discrimination. While several aspects of this review 
are strongly relevant to good relations, the primary focus is on how we can address 
the problems associated with prejudice against particular social groups.  
 
Section 2 (The social psychology of prejudice) summarises current social 
psychological knowledge based on empirical evidence about the processes that 
underlie prejudice. Much of the evidence is based on experimental tests, providing  
a basis for generalisable conclusions about mechanisms and processes involved  
in prejudice. This includes the potential roots, separate elements and different  
forms of prejudice. It includes theory and evidence on: how intergroup conflict,  
status differences and differences in social values contribute to prejudice; how basic 
psychological processes of categorisation, stereotyping and identification with social 
groups set a frame for prejudice; and how prejudice arises in different forms such as 
attitudes and feelings. The section also examines how prejudice is manifested more 
subtly through language, non-verbal and unconscious or uncontrolled processes. 
The section considers research on factors that can reduce or inhibit prejudice,  
and how the different forms that prejudice takes can affect people’s experiences  
of being a target of prejudice. It is argued that building on the insights from social 
psychological research can provide a firm foundation for monitoring and tackling 
prejudice. The section identifies what we need to measure in order to track changing 
prejudices in the UK and to identify the most useful avenues for intervention.  
 
Section 3 (Measuring prejudice) provides examples of questions that illustrate 
aspects of the framework of prejudice that was set out in Section 2. These questions 
are drawn from an extensive investigation of UK surveys or European surveys that 
have been fielded in the UK. Not all components of prejudice have been examined  
in such surveys, and some have yet to be developed for use in these contexts.  
 
Section 4 (Can prejudice be stopped?) considers the gulf between studies of the 
prevalence of prejudice and policy to determine interventions. There are few 
systematic tests of how well interventions work. This section examines examples of 
tests of various field experiments (intervention studies) to reduce prejudice. The 
purpose is partly to illustrate that it is feasible and useful to conduct such work, but 
also to highlight that more work is needed in this area. This section also considers 
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routes to intervention during childhood, before prejudices become entrenched.  
The scope to develop such approaches is explored.  
 
Section 5 (Conclusions and implications) summarises the key points from the 
preceding sections and considers implications for future investigation, intervention 
and evaluation relating to the Commission’s mission. 
 
1.3 Prejudice and good relations 
 
What is prejudice? 
The premise of this review is that, in general terms, prejudice needs to be viewed  
as a process within a set of relationships, rather than a state or characteristic of 
particular people (Abrams and Houston, 2006; Abrams and Christian, 2007).  
That is, we need to understand the different forms prejudice might take, when it 
might be expressed, and what factors promote or inhibit its expression. It is as 
important to know about the conditions that give rise to, and can counter, prejudice, 
as to measure the particular amount or virulence of prejudice at a particular time. 
Prejudice can be directed to a wide range of groups and, and can be expressed  
in a wide variety of ways. Therefore, it is necessary to think broadly about the  
types of ‘benchmarks’ that will be useful for measuring change. It is also  
necessary to break down the concept of prejudice into distinct components and  
to understand how and when these fit together to produce discriminatory outcomes 
and inequality. Equally important, however, is to achieve these goals within a 
unifying conceptual framework. 
 
Within psychology there have been numerous attempts to define prejudice.  
Crandall and Eshelman (2003) note that prejudice cannot always be described  
as irrational or unjustified and that it is therefore better to define it as ‘a negative 
evaluation of a social group or an individual that is significantly based on the 
individual’s group membership’ (p. 414). This, unfortunately, leaves us slightly adrift 
in terms of policy because it neglects prejudice that does not involve negative 
evaluations. Therefore the approach taken in this review is to define prejudice as: 
 
‘bias that devalues people because of their perceived membership of a  
social group’. 
 
This definition allows prejudice to arise from biases in different forms. It is not 
assumed that all biases are harmful or particularly consequential. Some are quite 
favourable (for example, the belief that Chinese people are better at maths than 
Europeans would be favourable towards Chinese people in Britain). Prejudice arises 
8 
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when such biases are potentially harmful and consequential because they reduce 
the standing or value attached to a person through their group memberships. This 
can occur when stereotypes, attitudes and emotions towards the group are directed 
at an individual member of the group.  
 
It is important to distinguish awareness of group differences from bias and prejudice. 
Some groups are manifestly unequal: they are poorer, less well educated, have had 
fewer opportunities, and visibly have lower occupational positions, worse health or 
engage in more crime. Some groups have more power than others in society. It is 
not prejudiced to be aware of, and concerned about, these differences. 
 
On the other hand, people’s knowledge is often incomplete or wrong, and they  
may also inappropriately generalise their knowledge, resulting in bias and prejudice. 
For example, it is false and clearly prejudiced to assume that every Muslim in the UK 
poses a terrorist threat. It is true that mothers are women, but false to assume that 
all women are (or should be) mothers. It is true that elderly people are generally  
less physically mobile than younger people but false that all people with reduced 
mobility are elderly. Actions or policies intended to help certain groups of people who 
are assumed to be dependent or needy (for example, through free bus passes or 
maternity leave) involve assumptions that may well result in disadvantages to other 
categories of people that are assumed to be independent. These assumptions are 
prejudices and for particular individuals may be just as damaging as direct hostility. 
So from a policy perspective, an important task is to identify which prejudices are 
consequential and which are harmful, and to target these.  
 
Good relations 
The review focuses primarily on prejudice. It also briefly considers the relationship 
between prejudice and good relations. These are not opposites. Either or neither can 
be present. It seems useful to treat good relations and prejudice as two independent 
aspects of social relationships. In terms of good relations people may be more or 
less cohesive, considering themselves to be and acting as a cooperative, mutually 
supportive and coherent group. In terms of prejudice people may be unconcerned 
about other groups and their differences or they may be highly attuned to potential 
differences, comparisons, threats and so on posed by external groups. Table 1.1 
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The notion of good relations tends to emphasise a situation in which people feel part 
of a cohesive group and focus on sustaining harmonious and positive relationships 
within that group (which may include bridges to other groups) and with a positive 
outlook towards members of other groups. This situation of good relations with low 
prejudice can be labelled as harmonious cohesion.  
 
Prejudice tends to be seen as antipathy between groups, and there are people who 
have no great commitment to their particular community who may hold society and 
10 
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various groups in contempt. This idea of the classic bigot perhaps suggests a state 
of high prejudice and low good relations, a situation we can call malign antipathy. 
 
There are many situations in which relationships within a community are strong and 
cohesive but this is partially a result of, or may generate, the presence of a common 
enemy (either within or outside). For many people there was a strong sense of 
Britishness during the Falklands conflict, but because it was a conflict this was 
accompanied by a high level of hostility and prejudice towards Argentineans. One 
can imagine how a formerly ethnically homogenous community that faces substantial 
immigration may begin to shift from harmonious cohesion to cohesion rooted more in 
rivalry or potential conflict. A combination of good relations internally and rivalry can 
be labelled rivalrous cohesion. 
 
Finally, there can be an absence of both good relations and prejudice. A set of 
people who hold no particular prejudices may be atomised and disconnected from 
one another with no strong ties even though they occupy the same geographical 
location. For example, wealthy residents of Kensington apartment blocks may be 
very diverse in terms of their group memberships and may have no axes to grind 
against any particular groups. But they may also have no sense of mutual 
commitment. This combination can be labelled benign indifference. 
 
It is likely that some efforts to promote good relations may reduce prejudice 
indirectly, and that some efforts to reduce prejudice could indirectly promote good 
relations. On the other hand, building community cohesion could inadvertently 
increase prejudices towards immigrants or other groups that are perceived to pose  
a threat. To illustrate this point, consider data from Northern Ireland. Cairns and 
Hewstone (2005) observed that (in line with other research) people who were  
more positive towards their own group tended also to be more positive towards  
the out-group (suggesting an overall ‘good relations’ effect). But they were also 
relatively more biased in favour of their own group (indicating rivalrous cohesion). 
Only those who did not identify strongly with their in-group showed no in-group  
bias (a state of benign indifference). However, even this depended on whether it  
had been a peaceful or volatile year. In volatile years even people who did not 
strongly identify with their own community showed in-group bias (perhaps a state  
of malign antipathy). Therefore, while both reducing prejudice and building good 
relations are important objectives that share some features, each may pose 
distinctive problems for policy. 
 
Other detailed reports consider aspects of community cohesion and good relations 
but do not consider the specific issues affecting the forms prejudice takes towards 
11 
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12 
different social groups (see Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 2007).  
The potential complementarities and disjunctions between a community integration 
approach and a prejudice reduction strategy remain to be explored. However, 
research generally has not considered these two themes in a coordinated way.  
This review therefore includes only a brief section on good relations as a route to 
prejudice reduction (in Section 3) and refers readers to a separate review focusing 
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2. The social psychology of prejudice 
 
This section provides a summary of different components of prejudice that  
have been identified in social psychological research going back to the 1930s.  
It is not intended to provide a historical narrative of how theory and research have 
developed since then, but rather to set out what is known currently and therefore 
what may be considered key components of prejudice that could be applied to a 
cross-strand approach.  
 
The approach taken here is to focus on the processes that cause and reduce 
prejudice rather than to view prejudice as a static phenomenon. This approach 
assumes that all prejudice arises in an intergroup context, a relationship between 
people that is framed by their membership of different social groups within a social 
system. People bring things into this context, such as their values, views about 
equality, their personality and their past experiences. These will affect how they 
interpret and respond to the intergroup context. As a result prejudice, or rather 
prejudices, can take many forms, and the same person might express prejudice  
in one way but not another, or towards one group but not another. This means we 
need to understand how prejudice is manifested and to be able to measure these 
manifestations. Prejudice is also a part of people’s experience, and therefore they 
engage with prejudice in a variety of ways, including being a victim of prejudice, 
encountering people who challenge their prejudices, and trying to avoid being 
prejudiced. As a framework for describing the components of prejudice in this 
process-focused approach it is therefore convenient to think in terms of four broad 
aspects: the overarching intergroup context, the psychological bases of prejudice, 
manifestations of prejudice, and engagement with prejudice (see Figure 2.1). 
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During different periods of social psychological research, different perspectives  
and levels of analysis have found greater or lesser favour. Older approaches have 
been continually updated and incorporated into more modern theories and research 
methods. The result is a cumulative knowledge base in which one can have a high 
degree of confidence. For more extended accounts of the development of theories  
of intergroup relations and prejudice, see Abrams and Hogg (1990, 2001, 2004)  
and Hogg and Abrams (1988, 2001). The following subsections identify features  
of intergroup relationships that need to be evaluated when trying to assess the 
components of prejudice. Policy-makers or researchers may have considered these 
before individually, but they have not been combined within a framework that allows 
us to decide which is likely to be most important or relevant as a focus of 
interventions in particular contexts of prejudice.  
 
2.1 Context of intergroup relations 
Any analysis of prejudice must begin with an analysis of the social context within 
which it arises. Intergroup relations, and prejudice in particular, need to be 
understood using multiple levels of analysis (Abrams and Christian, 2007; Abrams 
and Hogg, 2004). It is beyond the scope of this review to consider the historical, 
sociological and political contexts of prejudice. Although they are essential for 
understanding the broader issues, what is important here is that prejudice is 
mediated psychologically, that is, through people’s interpretation of the social 
context. Therefore we can incorporate the consequences of historical, cultural and 
societal phenomena by considering how people make sense of the intergroup 
relationships that affect them. More broadly, the social identity approach to 
intergroup relations (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) holds that 
people are sensitive to differences in status between groups and that they will try to 
sustain a positive in-group identity by achieving a distinctive and respected position 
for their in-groups. Their responses to status inequality will depend on whether they 
view status differences as legitimate and stable, and whether they can directly 
compete or may have to create new ways to accentuate positive differences, as  
well as whether it is feasible to move between social groups and categories easily 
(see Ellemers, Spears and Doojse, 2002). 
 
Conflict 
It seems mundane to start with the issue of conflict but it is often overlooked. 
Antipathy between groups is often associated with their belief that they have a 
conflict of interests. In his classic studies of boys at summer camps, Sherif (1966) 
showed that any two groups could be created and turned into hostile enemies simply 
by making them negatively interdependent. That is, if one group’s gain is the other’s 
loss, we can be sure that hostility, negative stereotypes and prejudice will follow. 
14 
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Sherif also showed that intergroup relations could be improved by setting goals 
where the groups were positively interdependent, in other words when neither group 
could succeed without the other’s help or contribution. This research clearly points  
to the need to evaluate whether groups are perceived to have direct conflicts of 
interests, a point that is also addressed in the later section on intergroup threat.  
 
However, as other sections will show, the insights and conclusions from Sherif’s 
research are insufficient to resolve the problem of prejudice. It is clear that prejudice 
is not always based on people’s cost-benefit analysis or material self-interest.  
First, as described later, even when there are no direct conflicts of interest, merely 
assigning people into distinct categories can be sufficient to generate prejudices and 
discrimination between groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Second, with many groups 
in society there are either temporary or long-standing conflicts with others over 
resources, rights or other issues. Often we have little direct control of influence over 
these conflicts. Therefore we need to understand how to recognise when these are 
leading to dangerous prejudices and how to promote good relations even while such 
conflicts require long-term resolutions. 
 
Intergroup threat 
To the extent that a group is seen to pose a threat people may also argue that it is  
a legitimate target of prejudice and discrimination. It would be a mistake to assume 
that actual threat is well mirrored by perceived threat. In addition, threats can take 
different forms, and these can have distinct implications for the levels and forms of 
prejudice. Stephan, Ybarra and Bachman (1999) and Stephan and Stephan (2000) 
developed an ‘integrated threat’ theory of prejudice, focusing primarily on interethnic 
prejudice. The threats fall into three general types: realistic threat (safety, security, 
health), symbolic threat (to culture, for example) and economic threat.  
 
Using Britain as an example, it is clear that there are substantial economic threats 
from the Far East ‘Tiger’ economies. However, it may be that people are more 
concerned about the economic threat from immigration, for instance. There is no 
reason to assume that people have a clear grasp of macro-economics, and there are 
good reasons to expect that they will focus on tangible simple and immediate factors. 
Of course, an out-group that benefits the country or one’s in-group economically 
(such as Polish temporary workers) may also be perceived to pose a threat in other 
respects (for example to culture or safety). Thus, depending on the mixture of threats 
people may feel ambivalent, and behave inconsistently towards particular groups. 
Nonetheless, certain groups are largely viewed as posing threats and others less so. 
A fourth element in Stephan and Stephan’s model is ‘intergroup anxiety’, which is 
discussed further below. The important point is that without measuring perceptions of 
15 
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threat it is more difficult to anticipate how prejudice will be manifested and what 
forms discrimination might take.  
 
Group size 
The power threat hypothesis assumes that racial animosity increases as the 
proportion of the minority in the population increases (Oliver and Mendelberg, 2000; 
McLaren, 2003). However, recent analysis suggests that the intensity of that 
animosity is more likely to be a function of the immediate ratio of minority members 
in the situation. Specifically, the level of barbarity of lynch mobs increased as their 
numbers increased relative to the number of victims. The level of barbarity was not 
related to the proportion of minority members in the community more generally. This 
makes sense given that higher proportions may well increase interethnic contact, 
which can potentially reduce interethnic tension. However, if there is tension, 
victimisation of minorities is more likely if they are in a vulnerable (for example, 
isolated) position (Leader, Mullen and Abrams, 2007). Moreover, cross-sectional and 
longitudinal evidence from the Group-Focused Enmity in Europe (GFE) survey in 
Germany suggests that higher proportions of Turkish immigrants provide greater 
opportunities for positive contact with Turks. This results in more frequent contact 
and a higher probability of having Turkish friends. In turn, Germans who had more 
contact and had Turkish friends showed less prejudice (Wagner, van Dick, Pettigrew, 
and Christ, 2003).  
 
Research has shown that there are substantial effects of perceiving oneself or  
one’s group to be in a numerical minority (Mullen, Johnson and Anthony, 1994). For 
one thing, smaller groups are likely to be less powerful and we know that power can 
foster less carefully controlled or considered action (Fiske, 1993). Smaller groups 
attract more attention, and members of such groups regulate their own behaviour 
more intensively (for good or bad, depending on their goals). Consequently, 
situations in which particular groups are likely to be small and concentrated while 
also visible to larger surrounding groups (such as within a particular neighbourhood 
or district or school) may be those in which they are especially vulnerable. 
 
Power 
Power can have similar psychological effects to group size (Keltner and Robinson, 
1996). That is to say, a person who comes from a powerful group or holds a  
powerful role may subjectively feel powerful and behave in a powerful way even 
when he or she is not in a numerical majority. A line manager is in this situation,  
and organisations often have rules that give line managers authority to instruct 
subordinates. The problem is that even when the rules (for example, laws) demand 
that groups be treated equally, people may still use knowledge and cues about the 
16 
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relative social status or standing of different groups to treat members as if they were 
subordinate. It follows that measuring the perceived power or social status of 
different groups may be highly informative in understanding why members of some 
groups are not treated as equals. For example, people in powerful roles who are 
judging others are more likely to attend to information that confirms stereotypes than 
information that disconfirms stereotypes.   
 
Recent work by Weick (2008) also suggests that people in powerful positions see 
their world in more simplistic terms, applying stereotypes not only to others but to 
themselves. However, another way to look at the evidence is that powerless people 
tend to be attentive to details and to evidence when making judgements about 
others, whereas powerful people have greater psychological freedom to make less 
systematic summary judgements. Powerful people can therefore show greater 
flexibility in the way they judge others and the challenge may be to prevent them 
from making erroneous or inappropriate generalisations. While power may ‘corrupt’, 
it tends do so only among those who are already motivated to be corrupt. Members 
of powerful groups tend to be more biased against members of other groups 
(Richeson and Ambady, 2001; Sachdev and Bourhis, 1991) but in certain situations 
they may be more generous for the common good (Galinsky, Gruenfeld and Magee, 
2003). An important message from this research is that being placed in a powerful 
role may generally (and without their awareness) increase a person’s propensity to 
act in a discriminatory way but that this can be overcome.  
 
2.2 Bases of prejudice 
Prejudice can have a variety of bases. This section considers the values people 
apply to intergroup relationships, the way they make use and apply categories to 
define those relationships, and the importance of these categories for people’s sense 
of identity. Another basis for prejudice lies in people’s personality, but as it is 
arguable whether this is amenable to change it is not discussed in detail in this 
section. It is covered briefly in the section on engagement. 
 
Values 
Values express what is important to people in their lives, such as equality, social 
justice, social power, achievement, respect for tradition and pleasure. Values guide 
attitudes (Schwartz  and Bardi, 2001) and behaviour (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003). 
Values are related to attitudes and to a wide range of behaviours, such as consumer 
purchases, cooperation and competition, intergroup social contact, occupational 
choice, religiosity and voting (see review in Schwartz and Bardi, 2001). Schwartz 
(1992, 2007) has developed and validated a theory of basic values and developed  
a widely used measurement instrument. This questionnaire measures a system of 
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values, any of which can be relevant to any particular issue. The importance of 
measuring values is reflected by inclusion of the values instrument as a core part  
of the European Social Survey. The survey data allow researchers to understand 
differences in social value priorities at two levels – differences between the 
importance attached to particular values by different social groups, and also 
differences among the value priorities of individuals within groups. For some groups, 
particular values are viewed as closer to ‘morals’, that is fundamental societally 
accepted principles, such as ‘fairness’, that guide action. Other values (and the same 
ones viewed by other groups) are viewed more as priorities or choices. So for 
example, respect for tradition is likely to have greater prominence in some religious 
groups than others and than among secular groups.  
 
Prejudice, measured in terms of disdain, disrespect or perhaps hatred, is often 
fuelled by a perception that an out-group (a group that one’s own is compared with) 
holds values that are contemptible or even disgusting. Calls for ‘regime change’,  
acts of genocide and international economic sanctions reflect challenges at the  
level of collective values, not acts of specific retribution for particular instances of 
wrongdoing. Therefore, an analysis of prejudice that ignores values and instead 
focuses only on specific attitudes or behaviour, risks missing a crucial part of the 
psychological context. Measuring and comparing the priority given to particular 
values by different groups can provide important insight into why they may be the 
targets or sources of hostility and prejudice. It can, therefore, help to identify where 
interventions can usefully be targeted.  
 
Egalitarianism and contrasting values 
Katz and Haas (1988) proposed that egalitarianism and the Protestant Work Ethic 
(PWE) - two strongly held values among white North Americans - were especially 
relevant to modern forms of prejudice, in particular what they labelled ‘ambivalent 
racism’. Whereas higher egalitarianism was associated with more pro-black 
attitudes, a stronger PWE was related to more anti-black attitudes. More generally, 
to the extent that a group appears not to uphold an important value, there is the 
potential that it will be seen as a legitimate target for prejudice. For example, some 
white British people may feel hostile towards Muslims because the latter are not 
viewed as egalitarian. They may feel hostile towards Caribbean black people 
because they perceive them as not working hard enough. Thus, although these  
‘out-groups’ may share some values with the majority, prejudice against them is 
depicted as ‘reasonable’ because of the group’s perceived failure to adhere to other 
values. As described later, there are other examples where prejudices (and resultant 
discrimination) can occur apparently despite the presence of well-intentioned values 
or attitudes. Kinder and Sear’s (1981) theory of symbolic racism and McConahay’s 
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(1986) work on ‘modern racism’ emphasise similar points, particularly that the 
violation of the PWE lies at the heart of whites’ antipathy to blacks, and that the 
special treatment given to blacks violates an individualistic interpretation of fairness. 
 
More recent ideas about egalitarianism suggest that it may serve as a ‘prejudice 
antidote’ by encouraging positive responses to minority or disadvantaged groups 
(Dasgupta and Rivera, 2006). Authoritarianism only seems to relate to prejudice 
among people who do not have egalitarian values (Oyamot, Borgida and Fisher, 
2006). Other values might actively increase prejudice towards particular groups 
depending on whether those groups meet the implied objectives of such values. For 
example, in a situation where the PWE is made more salient (relevant, noticeable  
or attention-grabbing), attitudes to groups that stereotypically ‘fail’ to adhere to that 
value (such as overweight people, or black people in the United States – see Biernat 
and Vescio, 2005) become more negative. In general, it is understandable that one 
reason for feelings of antipathy towards a different group is that it is perceived as 
prioritising different values to our own (Haddock and Zanna, 1998). 
 
Social categorisation and stereotyping  
One immediate question from the preceding statement is why people care so  
much about these shared values. Four decades of empirical research and  
enormous historical evidence demonstrates that a strong predictor of prejudice  
is whether, when comparing themselves with others, people perceive themselves  
as belonging to a social category (‘in-group’) rather than simply as individuals  
(Tajfel and Turner, 1979).  
 
Social categorisation 
Social categorisation, which is a highly automatic, flexible and natural process, 
immediately creates the potential for generalisation about members of groups.  
Much of the time the categories we apply to people are useful, functional and indeed 
essential for navigating our lives. For example, a uniform is a vital sign allowing  
us to know who is a member of the emergency services. We are highly responsive  
to whether or not people are adults or children. Toilets in public places are  
pre-categorised by gender.  
 
However, such convenient distinctions can readily become not just ‘descriptive’  
but prescriptive, and thereby can provide a socially unquestioned mechanism for 
discrimination. Once social categories are in place they become imbued with 
meaning that denotes status, power and even differences in rights. We think little of 
a sign on a suburban wall saying ‘No Ball Games’, though this is implicitly directed 
entirely at children. Imagine how people might react if the sign said ‘no children’,  
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or conversely how surprising it would be to read, ‘noisy children and bouncing balls 
will be most welcome’. The point is simply that even without malicious intent, social 
categorisation itself can be a vehicle for discrimination.  
 
Categorisation can be used as a basis for much worse too. The most obvious 
examples are apartheid and racially segregated schooling in the US. There are also 
less dramatic instances such as gender-segregated sports and selective education 
(grammar schools) in the UK.  
 
Stereotyping 
This natural process of using social categories also brings with it a second powerful 
process in the form of stereotyping. There is a wealth of research into the way 
stereotypes are formed, maintained and can be changed, but the basic point is  
that we all rely on stereotypes to make subjectively ‘informed’ judgements about 
ourselves and others (Schneider, 2004). To take a simple example, if there are three 
men and three women and the task is to move a piano, the chances are that the  
men will be more likely to do the lifting and the women to hold the door. Why? Not 
because men hold women in contempt but because stereotypically, and reasonably, 
men are physically stronger than women, all else being equal. In most situations, 
generalising stereotypes enable people to make assumptions about others that oil 
the wheels of social interaction and are unlikely to be challenged.  
 
Such stereotypical expectations help to make life predictable, but the problem is that, 
inevitably, they are often misapplied. In our example, one of the men might have a 
weak back, one of the women may be a regular weight trainer. Erroneous application 
of stereotypes may often be an innocent consequence of pragmatic use of social 
categorisation to apply a general image about a whole category to a particular 
member of that category. Of course it becomes much more consequential and 
important when the stereotype involves attributes that might affect life chances:  
for example, stereotypes that managers are usually men, carers are usually women, 
or boys ‘should’ be more interested in maths and science.   
 
In addition, because people tend to treat out-groups as more homogeneous than  
in-groups, there are likely to be miscategorisations that make the use of stereotypes 
even more wide of the mark. For example, many Westerners find it difficult to 
distinguish visually between Chinese and Japanese Asians, or between Indian, 
Pakistani and other people who share a skin colour but might have extremely 
different cultures, beliefs and practices. Application of a general stereotype on the 
basis of appearance is likely to result in important errors.  
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Despite these natural psychological consequences of categorisation, there  
are strong positives too. As UK society becomes increasingly multinational, 
multiracial and multicultural we have opportunities to use what is known as ‘multiple 
categorisation’ to reduce prejudicial assumptions and to facilitate more open-minded 
orientations to a whole range of social groups. However, the fundamental problem 
then shifts from ‘who are they?’ to ‘who are we’? In any case, an important way to 
assess society’s potential for prejudice is to evaluate how people use and apply 
social categories when they judge one another. 
 
Self-categorisation, social identity and stereotype application 
Not only do we categorise others, but research also shows that we categorise 
ourselves. Decades of research using the ‘minimal group paradigm’ shows that the 
mere act of categorising people is sufficient to produce discriminatory behaviour. 
Even when they can make no personal gain, are unaware of the particular 
individuals who make up their own and other groups, and when the people they can 
give resources to are completely anonymous, people will still favour members of 
their own category over people they believe to belong to others (Tajfel and Turner, 
1979). It seems that the basis for this is that people psychologically enlarge their 
self-concept to include the category they believe they belong to. By favouring other 
members of that category, people psychologically favour themselves.  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, just as the categorisation of other people is likely to mean that 
we use stereotypes to judge one another, there is clear evidence that we apply 
social stereotypes of our in-groups to ourselves (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and 
Wetherell, 1987). And just as stereotypes can harm or favour members of other 
groups, self-stereotyping can be enabling or disabling for ourselves.  
 
Stereotype application 
One way to understand how stereotypes affect behaviour is shown in Figure 2.2. 
Essentially, in any situation where we observe others we are likely to apply our 
implicit knowledge of social stereotypes relating to those people’s group 
memberships. We then draw inferences about those people (for example, why  
they engaged in an action or why it had certain outcomes). This inference tends  
to be confirmed through two routes. First we may tend to assume the stereotype  
is correct and behave towards the person on that basis. Second the person may 
react in a way that is consistent with the stereotype to fit in with our actions.  
 
Imagine, for example, a parking accident on a rainy day in which a driver reverses 
into another car. If the driver is young we might assume the accident is a result of 
inexperience and that the driver required more practice. By advising the driver to  
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get more lessons we are confirming in our own minds that this is the correct 
interpretation, but also reinforcing in the driver’s mind the linkage between youth and 
inexperience. In contrast, if the driver is old we might assume the accident is a result 
of declining ability to control the car and that the driver either needs special driving 
aids (for example, parking sensors) or should be prevented from driving. By offering 
such advice to the driver we both confirm the stereotype in our own minds but also 
lead the driver to wonder whether he or she is able to drive any longer.  
 
The point here is that people are likely and willing to make such highly consequential 
inferences even when they lack critical information (for example, was the person 
drunk? How long had they been a driver? How long had they owned the car?). 
Stereotype-based inferences therefore have substantial potential to affect the  
way we treat others and how others respond to our treatment. Measuring and 
understanding social stereotypes can give us information about how groups may be 
subjected to discrimination based on biased inferences in consequential situations.  
 
The model also illustrates that there are several points at which interventions  
might be effective. These could be introduced at different steps in the process.  
For example, we could try to prevent people relying so heavily on stereotypes when 
they make inferences, or we could intervene to prevent the inferences leading to 
confirmatory conclusions (for example, leave no room for discretion in treatment  
of reverse parking accidents) or we could try to prevent the negative influence of 
stereotypes on people’s own behaviour or self-concepts. An example of such 
interventions is given in the stereotype threat part of the Engagement With Prejudice 
section (2.4) of this chapter. 
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Social identity 
Stereotype confirmation processes are only part of the story because we play an 
active role in defining and defending our own social category memberships. To the 
extent we see ourselves as belonging to an in-group, we gain value and meaning  
for our own sense of identity through comparisons between that group and other 
groups. The more we positively identify with the group the more we will be motivated 
to make comparisons that bring favourable outcomes. A group that is not at the top 
of the pecking order may more actively compare itself with other groups that are 
further down rather than groups above them. This can meet people’s needs for  
self-esteem, as well as for more mundane things such as claims to resources and 
power, and existentially significant things such as a sense of purpose and meaning 
(see Abrams and Hogg, 2001, and a very extensive literature on social identity 
theory from Tajfel and Turner, 1979, to Abrams and Hogg, 1988 onwards).  
 
Like self-categorisation, social identification can be a double-edged sword. On  
the one hand, a sense of pride and identity can motivate pro-social behaviour,  
it can build group cohesiveness and cooperation, and it can provide the vehicle for 
influencing large numbers of people (for example, co-opting them to contribute to  
a charity). On the other hand, strong social identification with a category, with the 
resultant embedding of one’s identity largely within that category, can provide the 
basis of protracted intergroup conflict (for example, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict  
or the Troubles in Northern Ireland), and ultimately genocide. Without an 
understanding of the role of social categorisation and social identification any 
attempt to address the question of how to promote equality and human rights is  
likely to run into difficulties.  
 
The flexible use of social categorisation 
Some social categories are ‘apparent’ and therefore structure our perceptions 
regardless of our attitudes or opinions. Gender is one of these. There are some 
plausible biological and evolutionary arguments for why gender is likely to dominate 
our initial impressions of other people, and to frame our subsequent relationships 
with them. Other manifest differences, related to race as well as to physical 
impairment, could also be the basis for prejudice or discrimination for evolutionary 
reasons (Kurzban and Leary, 2001). However, an evolutionary explanation is 
severely limited by its inability to explain all those (millions of) instances where  
other considerations override the biological imperative of defending one’s genes  
or gene pool.  
 
Returning to the process of categorisation itself, one of the remarkable things  
about it is how easily and readily we can substitute one category system for another. 
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For example, children may be prejudiced against others who go to a different school 
from their own (often denoted through uniform as well as geographical location)  
or adult soccer fans may feel antipathy towards those supporting an opposing  
team. However, these feelings can be supplanted by a strong common bond when  
a higher order category (for example, regional or national) is relevant because of a 
comparison or competition with an out-group at that same level. It is rare to find 
supporters of local football teams fighting one another at an international match. 
 
Extending the football example further, supporters of teams quickly find new rivals or 
enemies as their team is either relegated or promoted between leagues. This point is 
important. People are not just generically prejudiced or unprejudiced. Prejudices 
have a systematic relationship to the position of oneself and one’s groups in the 
wider social structure. 
 
Age categories 
Ageism provides a further powerful example of how the flexible use of categories 
creates distinctions that are sometimes largely arbitrary but that nonetheless matter 
greatly. There are many different possible cut-off points for the categories ‘young’ 
and ‘old’ (let alone ‘middle aged’). Even the same person is likely to qualify their use 
of the terms. Artists may not be described as ‘old’ until they reach their seventies or 
eighties, whereas athletes are often described as ‘old’ on reaching their thirties.  
 
Moreover, the multiple legal, educational and economic age boundaries exemplify 
that we tend to want to impose categories even when they do not exist in reality. It is 
clearly absurd to argue that the age difference between a 17-year-and-one-day-old 
person versus a 17-year-and-364-day-old person is less important or relevant to the 
ability to vote than the difference between the latter and an 18-year-and-one-day-old 
person. Likewise school examinations are taken in the same school year by most 
pupils even though a child born in September will have the advantage of a whole 
year’s extra learning and experience compared with one born in August. However, 
society quite readily accepts the use of age thresholds and attaches enormous 
significance to them in, for instance, allowing permission to have sexual intercourse, 
get married, consume alcohol, drive a car, draw a pension, receive free services and 
benefits, and be paid less than others. 
 
We tend to think of these thresholds more as a matter of convenience than  
either logic or justice. However, it can be argued that the convenience is more 
psychological than real – it is counterproductive to test children earlier than is fair, it 
is wasteful to give free bus passes to people who are still working merely because 
they have reached the age of 50 or 60. It is bizarre to prevent people younger than 
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18 from participating fully in political democracy and perverse to say the least that 
they are entitled to marry and have children before they are deemed capable of 
exercising political judgement. And there is a reasonable case for judging people  
on the basis of their capacity and qualifications rather than their age. 
 
The point of these observations about age is that they show how readily people  
will adopt and use social categorisation for managing their relationships. The 
categorisations are shared points of reference that allow us to organise our acts  
and attitudes in a way that makes sense to us and to others. The problem is that 
weeds and flowers grow well in the same soil. The very same processes that allow 
us to navigate our social world effectively are the bedrock on which prejudice  
and inequality stand. Knowing how people use and apply social categorisations  
is therefore crucial for understanding how to prevent and tackle prejudice – as it 
were, how best to engage in both propagation and weeding. 
 
Intergroup similarity and categorisation 
In fact there are several theories about how categorisation can be a basis for 
prejudice reduction. Some of the basic ideas are depicted in Figure 2.3. It is  
clear that when groups are seen as very distinct and separate there is maximum 
potential for prejudice between them, especially if there is also some degree  
of interdependence, for example, when one group’s gains depend on the  
other’s losses.  
 
How can this categorisation problem be overcome? One powerful candidate is 
‘decategorisation’, namely the idea that, through encouraging people to see others 
purely as individuals rather than as group members, general prejudice against 
groups will diminish. There is little doubt that without categorisation there can be no 
prejudice, but the question is whether the conditions for prejudice are likely to exist 
when group differences can be ignored in this way. In the context of racial and ethnic 
relations, this approach is akin to the ‘colour-blind’ view. By treating all people as 
individuals we can see past their skin colour or ethnicity and equality should prevail. 
 
We know that this can be achieved in principle with ad hoc groups (Brewer and 
Miller, 1984) but perhaps when group memberships are underscored by physical, 
geographical, linguistic and cultural differences they become very hard to ignore. 
Consequently other approaches have been developed. 
 
The Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000) proposes that 
prejudice can be reduced by ‘recategorisation’, specifically by highlighting that 
people share a larger, superordinate group, more akin to a melting-pot approach.  
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For example, Esses, Dovidio, Semenya and Jackson (2005) showed that people  
with a strong international identity had more positive attitudes to immigrants than  
did people with a strong national identity.  
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Recent important work by Crisp (Crisp and Hewstone, 2007) underlines that it is 
possible to use multiple category descriptions to defuse or at least change the 
direction of people’s prejudices. By making more than one axis of categorisation 
relevant in a context it is sometimes possible to offset the tendency to apply 
stereotypes. In principle one could offset prejudice based on ethnicity in a multiethnic 
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context by dividing activities according to gender, which should make ethnic 
stereotypes irrelevant. This sort of strategy works if none of the categories is 
‘dominant’, that is, not more strongly embedded psychologically or supported by 
social pressure. There is also a risk that ‘subtypes’ emerge so that instead of being 
diffused, prejudice becomes more highly focused (for example, white people’s 
prejudice against black people becomes focused in negative stereotypes of young 
black men). All else being equal, however, the more potential categorisations that 
are potentially relevant in a situation, the less likely it is that any one of these will 
predominate and frame attitudes and behaviour.  
 
There could be unexpected consequences of directing an intervention at prejudice 
towards a general category (such as ‘women’) if people actually tend to use 
subcategories such as ‘career women’ and ‘mothers’, and hold different attitudes 
towards each subcategory. Conversely, a specific goal of an intervention might be to 
encourage people to use subcategories rather than applying a general stereotype. 
Consequently, approaches to multiculturalism (and good relations) that opt for a 
single strategy (such as colour-blind or melting-pot approaches to multiculturalism) 
may work well under some circumstances but not others.  
 
Optimal distinctiveness 
As well as the cognitive effects of multiple categorisation, its effectiveness as a 
solution to intergroup prejudices also depends on other factors. Importantly, people 
are often motivated to sustain their subgroup identities – people from Yorkshire are 
as, if not more, attached to their Yorkshire identity as they are to English or British 
identity. Gaertner and Dovidio, as well as others (Brewer, 1991; Hewstone and 
Brown, 1986; Hornsey and Hogg, 2002), have recognised that perhaps an ideal 
outcome is that of ‘nested identities’, namely that people can view themselves as 
belonging to a group that is different from an out-group but that shares a common 
identity at the same time. One of the challenges is how to maintain the focus on the 
common identity without seeming to deny the importance of the subordinate identity. 
Brewer (1991) has shown that people prefer to feel they are part of a group that is 
sufficiently large or inclusive that it is meaningful but not so large that anybody could 
be a member. Attempts to assimilate people into a large superordinate group may 
therefore provoke a counter-reaction where they attempt to make their own particular 
group more distinctive. Given that people may gravitate towards identities that 
provide them with an optimal level of distinctiveness, strategies to build cohesion 
across different communities need to be considered in terms of how they might avoid 
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Category norms 
A further strategy is to focus people’s attention on ‘in-group’ norms that highlight 
tolerance and equality (Abrams and Hogg, 1988; Jetten, Spears and Manstead, 
1997). Instead of trying to change stereotypes about particular out-groups, the idea 
here is to change what people believe other in-group members do and expect. This 
is because when people identify with a social category they also embrace the norms 
of that category as the standards and reference points for their own views and 
actions. This offers the intriguing scenario of finding ways that groups can enhance 
their members’ identity by demonstrating that they are, for instance, more open, kind 
and tolerant than contrasting groups.  
 
Research on the way groups regulate the actions of their members shows that when 
attitudes based on core values of equality are framed as in-group norms, individuals 
who visibly challenge such norms are likely to be put under pressure to come into 
line and to be disliked. Moreover, this phenomenon is stronger if the person is an  
in-group member than an out-group member (see Abrams, Marques, Bown and 
Henson, 2000, in the context of attitudes towards immigration). This suggests that 
strategies to reduce prejudice towards particular groups may be open to influence by 
highlighting people’s shared membership of a group that has tolerant norms.  
 
What does seem clear is that, depending on the complexity of the social context and 
other factors, the different ways that people categorise their own and other groups 
has important implications for levels of prejudice towards those groups. Therefore, 
tracking the changing ways categories are applied can provide useful insights into 
the changing nature of prejudices.  
 
2.3 Manifestations of prejudice 
One of the important lessons from social psychological research is that prejudice  
can take many forms. These are not random though. Particular manifestations of 
prejudice depend on how a group is perceived and its status in society, or the 
intergroup context and bases for prejudice. Any attempt to gauge prejudice therefore 
needs to attend to both the degree to which it is being expressed and the way it is 
manifested. 
 
Stereotype content and benevolent prejudice 
Recent research has indicated that prejudice and stereotyping are not based only on 
negative perceptions. Rather, some apparently positive stereotypes can be used to 
justify the exclusion or oppression of certain groups in society. For example, sexism 
has traditionally been treated as unwarranted hostility and animosity towards 
women. However, it is clear that sexism actually has several distinct components. 
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Broadly these can be characterised as traditional hostile attitudes (for example, that 
women are demanding too much equality) and ‘benevolent’ attitudes. Benevolent 
sexism is not imbued with negative emotion, indeed it has quite the opposite tone, 
regarding women as important, to be valued, and indeed cherished. The reason that 
these attitudes are sexist is that they are conditional: only if women adhere to their 
traditional place as home-maker, carer and showing devoted loyalty to their men will 
they be treated with respect and protection.  
 
Many media images and social customs reinforce this idea (such as holding a door 
open for a woman, allowing women to go first, etc) in the form of etiquette and 
courtesy. But these attitudes and practices also reinforce the legitimacy of a social 
system in which men appear to have the right to dominate in terms of power and 
resources. Thus, benevolent prejudice is often highly patronising. As an example, 
Abrams, Viki, Masser and Bohner (2003) showed that when mock jurors were asked 
to rate the culpability of rape victims, those who had highly benevolent sexist 
attitudes were significantly more likely to blame a victim of rape by an acquaintance 
than rape by a stranger. For a benevolent sexist, a victim of stranger rape is 
‘innocent’ whereas a victim of acquaintance rape has, by allowing an acquaintance 
to be that close, violated her social role.  
 
Fiske and colleagues have extended this research on sexism into a more general 
theory of how groups are stereotyped. Social groups and categories that are of lower 
status are more likely to be stereotyped as warm but not competent (for example, 
home-makers and older people), resulting in ‘paternalistic prejudice’ (Fiske, Cuddy, 
Glick and Xu, 2002). Majority and usually high-status groups have a collective 
interest in sustaining these stereotypes because they form an important part of the 
ideologies that justify the social dominance of their group over others. Jost and 
Banaji (1994) referred to such beliefs as ‘system-justifying’ because, while serving to 
enhance the self-esteem of low-status group members, these beliefs also serve to 
maintain and justify the system that oppresses them. 
 
Based on these ideas Fiske and colleagues developed a ‘Stereotype Content 
Model’, which sets out the basic elements of all stereotypes. While the absolute 
comprehensiveness of the model could be challenged, there seems little doubt, 
based on substantial survey and experimental evidence, that it captures the major 
territory of many important and consequential stereotypes. For example, Fiske, 
Cuddy, Glick and Xu (2002) asked nine varied samples containing male and female 
participants to say to what extent a large set of groups (including gender, race, class, 
age and ethnic groups) displayed particular traits. Contrary to the idea that prejudice 
is based purely on antipathy, Fiske, Cuddy, Glick and Xu (2002) found that groups 
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were generally classified along the two dimensions of warmth and competence. 
Prejudice can take different forms. For example most of the groups were classified 
as either high in competence but low in warmth (‘envious prejudice’) or low in 
competence but high in warmth (‘paternalistic prejudice’). This is shown in Table 2.1. 
 
The way people depicted each group was determined by the socio-structural 
relationships among the groups. High-status groups were often perceived as 
competent but cold (for example, men and Jews), whereas low-status groups were 
perceived as warm but incompetent. As discussed below, these perceptions are also 
conditioned by the extent to which groups are perceived as competitive, and the 
extent to which they are seen as gaining unjust benefits. These perceptions also 
pave the way for strong emotional and behavioural responses to members of 
different groups. In general, however, the stereotype content model provides a 
powerful framework for mapping how groups are perceived at any point in time, and 
allows cross-strand comparisons. Therefore it would seem a very useful tool for any 
cross-strand approach to prejudice. 
 























Based on Fiske et al. (2002) 
 
Intergroup emotions and infrahumanisation 
Over the last 60 years or so social attitude researchers have tended to view 
prejudice as a system of beliefs. Recently, closer attention has been paid to the 
emotional basis of people’s orientation towards one another. Put simply, a person’s 
feelings of anger, fear, sympathy or disgust towards someone else may be more 
important than all the particular reasons why he or she has those feelings. We know 
from basic categorisation that people already have a tendency to view out-groups 
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less favourably than in-groups even when the membership of those groups has been 
temporarily or arbitrarily created. Both prejudice and good relations are likely to have 
important emotional bases which cannot easily be explained as rational responses  
to particular beliefs. Indeed, people can generate beliefs (that may become shared 
stereotypes) about a particular individual or group as a way of justifying emotions 
rather than being the cause of the emotions.  
 
Intergroup relations researchers, particularly Mackie and Smith (2002), have 
proposed that people who identify with a group share distinct emotions with  
their own groups and towards other groups. Whereas prejudice can be measured 
simply as liking versus disliking, intergroup emotions are both stronger and more 
specific in their implications. Specific emotions towards social groups are thought  
to arise from people’s appraisals (or evaluations) of the meaning of the group’s 
characteristics or actions. For example, in the UK, some majority white people might 
view immigrant populations as taking an unjustifiably large share of the cake, leading 
to anger and resentment. In contrast, homophobic attitudes may reflect uncertainty 
or moral or religious convictions, and these may be more associated with feelings  
of fear or disgust.   
 
An example of how prejudices can be based on quite different emotional profiles is 
shown in Figure 2.4 from evidence in the National Survey of Prejudice (Abrams and 
Houston, 2006). Both Muslims and gay men and lesbians were thought likely to 
evoke anger, but disgust was more likely in relation to gay men and lesbians and 
fear more likely in relation to Muslims. Both people over 70 and disabled people 
were somewhat admired, but at the same time they were likely to attract pity.   
 
Different emotions in turn motivate different actions.  For example, people who feel 
anger are likely to act aggressively or punitively whereas people who are fearful are 
likely to avoid contact with the group. Both anger and fear reflect a negative attitude, 
but with distinctly different implications for action. Similarly, contempt will produce 
very different actions from guilt. It is also true that emotions that arise when thinking 
about a group can affect other important phenomena. For example, when people  
feel angry their decisions are more risky, whereas when people feel fearful their 
decisions tend to become more cautious. As noted when discussing stereotype 
content earlier, we also need to recognise that appraisals and emotions can be 
complex and mixed resulting in constellations that have different implications for 
prejudice and discrimination. Of course, attitudes, stereotypes and emotions do not 
fully account for prejudiced behaviour because other constraints and forces come 
into play (including rules, norms and other personal or collective priorities), but of 
31 
 
PROCESSES OF PREJUDICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND INTERVENTION 
these three it seems that emotions are the best predictor (Maitner, Mackie  
and Smith, 2007). 
 
Figure 2.4  Emotions associated with different social groups  




Based on Abrams and Houston (2006) 
 
Infrahumanisation 
Social psychology research has not only focused on emotions we feel towards other 
groups, but also on emotions we expect from other groups. Leyens and colleagues 
(Vaes, Paladino and Leyens, 2002) showed how our assumptions about emotionality 
within out-groups is a subtle but real part of prejudice. Leyens distinguishes between 
‘primary emotions’ such as anger and fear that are experienced by both humans and 
animals, and ‘secondary emotions’ that are unique to human beings, such as guilt, 
melancholy and embarrassment (Ekman, 1992). There is a large volume of evidence 
showing that people tend to view in-groups as having uniquely human emotions 
more than out-groups (Leyens, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, Gaunt, Paladino, Vaes and 
Demoulin 2001; Paladino, Leyens, Rodriguez and Rodriguez, 2002).  
 
This ‘infrahumanisation’ has important implications. If we consider ourselves to be 
complex, subtle and perhaps sensitive people, it may serve our psychological and 
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social motives to view out-groups as somehow less so. In fact, if out-group  
members express secondary emotions they may be viewed especially negatively 
(Vaes, Paladino and Leyens, 2002). Why does an attack on the culture or values  
of an out-group member seem so easy? Perhaps because we tend to believe that 
the victims are not psychologically capable of being offended. Why does an attack 
on our own culture seem so offensive? Perhaps because the attackers seem so 
oblivious to its importance and significance to ourselves. Like the stereotype content 
model, work on intergroup emotions and infrahumanisation is at the leading edge of 
prejudice research in the UK, elsewhere in Europe and North America. 
 
Guilt and ‘pro-social’ emotions 
Finally, what are the prospects for so-called ‘prosocial’ emotions such as guilt, 
shame, compassion and forgiveness in reducing the effects of prejudice? 
Experimental research shows that when people feel guilty about their own group’s 
actions against another group, they are motivated to make amends (Branscombe, 
2004). Unfortunately, making people feel guiltier about inequality seems unlikely to 
be a useful solution. One reason is that people tend to avoid self-critical emotions 
such as guilt and shame. For example, the stronger people’s sense of national 
identity, the more resistant they become to feeling guilty about past national 
wrongdoing (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears and Manstead, 1998). Other evidence 
shows that raising people’s awareness of collective responsibility for injustice against 
another group may result in people judging that group as less human (Castano and 
Giner-Sorolla, 2006). On top of these risks, compared to other emotions such as 
shame, anger and compassion, guilt is relatively weak and self-centred, and more 
likely to lead to inaction than action (Iyer, Schmader and Lickel, 2007; Leach, Iyer 
and Pedersen, 2006). By contrast, evidence shows that positive feelings such as 
responsibility, forgiveness, compassion and empathy are associated with more 
positive intergroup relationships and greater humanisation of other groups (Galinsky 
and Moskowitz, 2000; Tam, Hewstone, Cairns, Tausch, Maio and Kenworthy, 2007). 
 
The language of prejudice 
Infrahumanisation is an example of ‘implicit prejudice’ because it tends to arise 
without conscious awareness and is less subject than blatant expressions of 
prejudice to pressures for social desirability and political correctness. Prejudice can 
be expressed in many ways. There is substantial literature on ‘ethnolinguistic vitality’, 
or the ways in which identity is expressed through language and linguistic cues. 
People can include or exclude others from their interactions by subtle use of, for 
example, accents or idioms that are exclusive to an in-group (Giles and Johnson, 
1987). Linguistic separateness between communities also reflects whether there are 
opportunities, capacity and motivation to engage in communication with out-groups.  
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Language is also used more directly to attack or undermine out-groups. For example 
white supremacist groups on the internet create a discourse that claims whites are 
the disadvantaged group (Douglas, McGarty, Bliuc and Lala, 2005). Although ‘hate 
speech’ against minorities is easy to detect, it may not be the most dangerous form 
of linguistic attack. As it is explicit, hate speech can be challenged and countered. 
But more subtle, implicit, forms of prejudice are also manifested through language. 
Research by Mullen and colleagues (Mullen, 2001, 2004; Mullen and Johnson, 1993, 
1995; Mullen and Leader, 2005; Mullen, Leader and Rice, 2005; Mullen and Rice, 
2003; Mullen, Rozwell and Johnson, 2000, 2001) shows that the ascription of names 
to in-groups and out-groups can vary in relation to both the positive or negative 
character of an emotion (valence) and the degree of complexity (high or low).  
 
Experiments and analyses of extensive archival evidence show that people tend to 
describe minority ethnic groups with ethnic slurs (ethnophaulisms) that are more 
negative and also simpler than those used to describe majority groups. More 
importantly, this research shows that the complexity, rather than the negativity,  
of these terms is most strongly associated with whether the group suffers from 
discrimination and disadvantage. A group that is commonly described using more 
complex language is less likely to be discriminated against. The combination of both 
negativity and simplicity in the way people describe minority groups is clearly 
predictive of whether these groups are targets of intergroup hostility (Mullen, 2005; 
Mullen and Rice, 2003). More recent research (Mullen, Calogero and Leader, 2007) 
has also shown that when people use simpler names for their ingroups they are 
more likely to engage in hostile ways to relevant out-groups. Thus, echoing the 
points made earlier about categorisation, ascribing simplistic generalisations such as 
‘axis of evil’ or ‘infidel’ to a whole group or nation is dangerous because simplification 
makes prejudice both more likely and more widespread. 
 
Broadly speaking, people are prone to a ‘linguistic intergroup bias’. People change 
the form, not just the content, of their language as a way of favouring their in-groups. 
They are more willing to use abstract terms and adjectives to describe positive  
things about their own group (such as ‘we are great’, ‘we are clever’) but concrete 
descriptions of behaviours or states to describe positive things about out-groups 
(such as ‘they performed well yesterday’). The reverse tendency applies when 
describing negative features (‘our economy is underperforming this year’, ‘their 
economy is weak’). These linguistic intergroup biases (Maass, Salvi, Arcuri and 
Semin, 1989) are not fixed features of communication: people vary from time to time 
and group to group. However, it can be highly informative to have an objective 
measure of language use as a way of understanding which groups are becoming 
subject to prejudice and are liable to be targets of discrimination.  
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People are often unaware of these ways of using language – those who want to 
make another group look bad spontaneously use more abstract and negative ways 
of describing them (Douglas and Sutton, 2003) and, equally important, linguistic 
intergroup biases are an insidious way of passing on prejudice and negative 
stereotypes over generations (Franco and Maass, 1999). On the other hand, raising 
people’s awareness of how these biases work can enable people who want to be 
unprejudiced to know how to use language in an unbiased manner (Douglas, Sutton 
and Wilkin, 2008). 
 
2.4 Engagement with prejudice 
 
Intergroup contact 
The extensive literature on intergroup contact (see Pettigrew, 1998, and Pettigrew 
and Tropp, 2006, for a meta-analysis of over 500 studies) demonstrates that early 
theorising by Allport (1954) has largely been supported. Contact between members 
of different groups fosters positive intergroup attitudes if the contact also involves 
similarity, common goals, institutional support and equal status. However, research 
has also highlighted a number of important caveats. First, we note that these optimal 
conditions for contact rarely exist. Second, it is important to distinguish between  
the frequency (or quantity) of contact and the quality of that contact. Frequent 
unpleasant contact is hardly likely to promote harmony. Figure 2.5 summarises 
current research evidence on the routes from contact to reduced prejudice.  
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Direct contact 
Further research suggests that a critical type of contact is contact ‘as friends’, but 
here again there are potential problems. If the friend is not seen as generally typical 
of their group it is unlikely someone will generalise their positive attitude to their 
friend towards the group as a whole. In any case, there is a question of what it is 
about friendship that helps to generate positive intergroup attitudes. Recently, 
Hewstone and colleagues (Brown and Hewstone, 2005) have highlighted that 
reciprocal self-disclosure seems to play an important role. This suggests that 
structured situations that promote mutual sharing of experiences and views can 
provide an important route for ensuring intergroup friendships form and generalise. 
 
Friendship is likely to build trust, reduce anxiety about interacting with out-group 
members (an element of the Stephan and Stephan integrated threat model referred 
to earlier), facilitate the taking of out-group perspectives and increase empathising 
with the out-group. All of these are ways of linking a person, psychologically, to an 
out-group and thus reducing the likelihood that prejudicial attitudes will be sustained.  
 
Extended contact 
Unfortunately, opportunity for contact is often restricted or non-existent. How many 
British people have ever met an Iraqi? How many Muslims socialise with Christians? 
In any intergroup divide, we are likely to find inner circles that have almost no  
contact with out-groups. Recent research has also begun to address this question. 
Two methods seem especially promising. One of these is indirect or ‘extended’ 
contact (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe and Ropp, 1997). The mechanism for 
extended contact is through awareness that another in-group member (ideally  
an in-group friend) is the friend of an out-group member; this reduces one’s own 
psychological distance from the out-group member and can promote positive 
attitudes. There are more concrete consequences of extended contact too,  
such as the in-group member passing on relevant information about the out-group, 
perhaps dispelling inaccurate stereotypes.  
 
Imagined contact 
Even extended contact may not be feasible under some circumstances. Either there 
are too few members of an in-group who are friends with out-group members, so that 
experiences cannot be shared and generalised, or the particular out-group members 
may be viewed as very atypical. For example, in the UK white Christians may regard 
their Asian Muslim friends as very unusual and unrepresentative of their group, 
which may actually reinforce prevailing stereotypes about ‘most’ Muslims.  
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Recently, a further technique has been developed to simulate the potentially positive 
effects of contact. Surprisingly, this technique calls only for people to be able to 
imagine positive contact with out-group members. There might be a variety of 
reasons why this ‘works’, including the possibility that, by mentally preparing for a 
potential interaction, people have to humanise and individualise the out-group 
member that they imagine (Turner, Crisp and Lambert, 2007). This in turn weakens 
negative attitudes that might have been acquired through other means such as 
exposure to media scare stories or stereotypes, or hearing other people’s prejudices. 
 
Contact and social exclusion 
Contact has a further implication, however, which is that it can serve as an index of a 
group’s risk of discrimination or social exclusion. For several reasons group isolation 
(or segregation, whether voluntary or not) restricts opportunities to engage with other 
networks and individuals. Just as personal isolation puts individuals at risk of 
individual exclusion, group isolation has similar effects at the group level. Moreover, 
effects of segregation seem likely to be compounded because people who feel 
included within a group may be unaware that their group as a whole is 
disadvantaged in significant ways (see Abrams, Christian and Gordon, 2007).  
 
Exclusion can also happen through the distribution of people within social settings. 
Concretely, children are excluded from the school staffroom, a rule with which  
most children and teachers are comfortable. More subtly, boardrooms and senior 
committees often have a conspicuous absence of women and members of ethnic 
minority groups. And in many sectors there is substantial sex and age segregation in 
the workplace (for instance, most nurses are women, most consultants are men,  
in most universities the senior positions are filled by older men). These imbalances 
have both structural and psychological effects. In particular, they give rise to 
tokenism (for example, presumptions that senior women are somehow a) atypical of 
women as a whole and b) of sufficient number to prove that the system is fair). Age 
Concern England’s research shows that intergenerational contact might have similar 
effects. Younger people with more friends over 70 years of age had significantly 
more positive expectations about ageing, particularly in not believing that 
competence declines with age (Age Concern England, 2008). 
 
Prejudice as a general phenomenon, and prejudiced individuals 
Focusing on either good relations or prejudice could imply different objectives.  
A good relations approach suggests it could be effective to encourage unprejudiced 
and positive relations across groups and communities in general (see Commission 
on Integration and Cohesion, 2007). A focus on prejudice might imply it would  
be more effective to tackle specific aspects of prejudice and conflict between 
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particular sets of groups. This review advocates analysing prejudice using  
a common framework, but deriving specific and distinctive strategies for tackling 
specific prejudices. 
 
The good relations objective raises the question of whether it is practical or useful  
to treat prejudice as a general phenomenon. That is, we need to consider whether  
a) some people are generally more prejudiced than other people, and b) whether a 
generic strategy might reduce prejudice of any kind, wherever or for whatever reason 
it occurs.  
 
There have always been researchers interested in explaining prejudice through 
personality differences. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford’s (1950) 
classic work on the authoritarian personality sought to establish a personality 
syndrome that could explain fascist beliefs. More recently, research on right-wing 
authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981) and on ‘social dominance orientation’ (Sidanius 
and Pratto, 1999) suggests that some people believe more strongly than others that 
society should be arranged in hierarchies, with more power and control in the hands 
of dominant groups. Researchers tend to argue that there are both individual 
differences in people’s tendency to have such ways of dealing with the world, but 
also strong situational differences that can affect people’s approach to one another.  
 
As an example, people with a high need for closure – the need to reach decisions 
quickly and finally without ambiguity – are likely to show more favouritism towards  
in-groups, more exclusion of non-conformists, and more prejudice against  
out-groups (Kruglanski, 2006; Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti and De Grada, 2006; 
Kruglanski, Shah, Pierro and Mannetti, 2002; Kruglanski and Webster, 1991; Shah, 
Kruglanski and Thompson, 1998; Van Heil, Pandelaere and Duriez, 2004; Webster 
and Kruglanski, 1998). Some people do have a higher need for closure than others 
(Webster and Kruglanski, 1994), but there is little that can be done about this. On the 
other hand, situational factors such as a noisy environment or time pressure are 
known to increase need for closure (Dijksterhuis, van Knippenburg, Kruglanski and 
Schaper, 1996; Ford and Kruglanski, 1995; Kruglanski, 2006; Kruglanski and 
Freund, 1983), meaning that these types of situation will also increase prejudice and 
increase the exclusion of non-conformists. As we have much readier control over 
situational things than we do over people’s personality, it is arguable that day-to-day 
management of situations in which people have to make choices and decisions 
about others (such as hiring decisions) are ones in which we need to be very careful 
to avoid pressures to reach closure.  
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The idea that some people have generalised prejudice, or ‘pan prejudice’ as Allport 
(1954) termed it, is important because it raises the possibility that education, 
particularly education targeted at these individuals, might be a cost-effective way to 
militate against prejudicial influences within society. Not all sexists are racists, and 
vice versa, but there is a tendency for prejudices to be clustered and thematic, and 
may have common underpinnings. A belief that differences between people are 
innate and cannot be changed (Haslam, Rothschild and Ernst, 2000) can underpin 
both racism and sexism. When considering educational interventions it is probably 
useful to think of which prejudices go together and tackle the underlying assumptions 
that support the prejudices. This way, programmes targeting racism may also help to 
diminish sexism, or prejudice against disabled people may be tackled in conjunction 
with ageism.   
 
Crandall and Eshelman (2003) proposed that really there are just two aspects to the 
expression of prejudice. First is the extent to which people feel or believe prejudice is 
justified (for example, because of something bad or wrong about the target group). 
Countering this is the extent to which people suppress their prejudices, either 
consciously or not. There can be multiple reasons why prejudices could be 
subjectively justifiable and why they may be suppressed, so the key to reducing 
prejudice is knowing which justifications to attack, and which suppressors to  
activate (for example, egalitarianism). The reason that prejudices towards related 
groups tend to go together is because similar justifiers or suppressors are at work. 
For example, prejudices against a variety of groups might be linked through the 
justification that people who live in the UK should speak English and adopt a  
‘British way of life’. But prejudices against some of these groups might be 
suppressed because people fear that they are not supposed to express prejudice.   
 
Crandall and Eshelman’s approach is attractively simple, but it does not really 
address the question of whether we can tackle ‘genuine’ prejudice, and it holds that 
‘all measures of prejudice are affected by processes that amend, cover, divert, 
obscure, stymie and falsify the underlying emotional state’ (p. 437). However, this 
seems an unnecessarily sceptical position. Expressions of prejudice are generally 
purposeful, or at least meaningful, and it seems unlikely that most people who do 
express prejudice are acting under false pretences. Therefore, while it is of intense 
interest to psychologists to unearth the privately held prejudices that people often 
suppress, the greater interest for policy is how to counter, or ideally remove, 
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Self-control over prejudice 
As governments and organisations increasingly attempt to promote equality,  
there are at least two likely consequences. First, people may feel resistant to such 
policies as affirmative action on the grounds that these contravene the idea that all 
individuals should be treated in the same way. Second, these policies highlight in 
people’s minds the relevance and importance of not being discriminatory. Yet 
research shows that motivation to be egalitarian does not always trump prejudice, 
and this happens for a variety of reasons. Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) identified a 
phenomenon known as ‘aversive racism’. They suggested that emotional reactions 
to some minority groups or out-groups can be deeply embedded in consciousness 
and cultural stereotypes. Because most people want to be fair most of the time, they 
will generally try to avoid letting such feelings affect how they treat people. However, 
when a situation is ambiguous, either because it is not obvious if they are being 
prejudiced or for other reasons, people’s feelings become manifested through 
choices. As one of many examples, when white people received a ‘misdirected’ 
phone call from a stranded motorist, asking them to call the breakdown services, 
they were more likely to help someone who was apparently white than someone who 
was apparently black.  
 
The aversive racism phenomenon raises the problem that people may not be able  
to control their prejudices. Indeed a significant line of research demonstrates that 
people hold strong ‘implicit associations’ (Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz, 1998) 
between particular social categories and evaluative reactions. These associations, 
which can be measured readily using computer-based tasks, seem to be quite robust 
and people are not easily able to control them. However, the relationship between 
measures of implicit prejudice and more overt prejudices is not always a strong one 
and research is currently directed to establishing whether the two aspects of 
prejudice have distinct effects on behaviour. As noted in Chapter 3, on interventions, 
it can be problematic to use implicit associations as an index of prejudice.  
 
In many surveys (such as the British Social Attitudes Survey) there are questions 
that ask people whether or not they are prejudiced. The meaning of answers to this 
type of question is difficult to interpret and the question itself places strong social 
desirability pressures on respondents. Instead it may be useful to ask whether 
people are motivated to avoid being prejudiced. Plant and Devine (1998) have 
shown that it is valuable to distinguish two elements of people’s self-control over 
prejudice. First, a person may genuinely aspire to be unprejudiced (or not). Second, 
a person may be concerned to avoid being perceived as prejudiced (or not). There 
are surprising numbers who are unprejudiced but do not care how they are viewed, 
or who are prejudiced but are concerned to avoid being viewed as such. Measuring 
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these aspects of motivation can help to identify where useful interventions should  
be targeted. The point is simply that the expression of prejudice and discrimination 
can be tackled at both levels: the level of shifting people’s fundamental values and 
goals to avoid being prejudiced, and the level of shifting their behaviour so that they 
behave in a non-prejudiced way, regardless of their beliefs. Arguably, working on  
the latter is a good way to influence the former. When the social environment has  
a pervasive norm of non-discrimination it is much more likely that people will 
internalise that norm.  
 
If education is a key, we need to consider what kinds of intervention might be  
useful. One approach is to try to find ways to raise people’s consciousness of their 
prejudices and get them to actively challenge their own stereotypes. This has been 
proven effective, at least in relation to anti-black prejudice among white Americans 
(Kawakami, Dovidio and Dijksterhuis, 2003). However, there are limitations. People 
might not be happy to volunteer for such education if they are already prejudiced. 
Also it is unclear whether ‘saying no to stereotypes’ is practical across all social 
groups. As noted earlier, stereotypes serve the functions of simplification and 
explanation, and in many situations they serve us well. Therefore, the challenge is 
more specific, namely to get people to challenge stereotypes that are, or others 
believe to be, unjustified and discriminatory. Targeting these requires research to 
identify what they are. 
 
Taking the preceding discussion together, Figure 2.6 summarises how a social 
psychological approach can be used to identify areas for intervention. This shows 
that prejudice necessarily begins with categorisation, which may have resultant 
stereotypes and emotions associated with it. People may endorse these images to a 
lesser or greater degree, which can also feed back to prompt further emotions. Both 
stereotypes and emotions can independently foster prejudice which in turn can lead 
to discrimination. Importantly, understanding how each of these features is operating 
can lead one to intervene at different stages. By introducing additional or alternative 
categories within the relevant context it may be possible to prevent the activation and 
application of problematic stereotypes. By introducing new knowledge and images of 
a social group it may be possible to disrupt or change the stereotype content or 
emotions that follow from the categorisation. By focusing on particular social values it 
may be possible to motivate people to avoid acting on the basis of stereotypes, even 
if they believe the stereotype is correct. Moreover, how or where the ‘control’ process 
happens can vary. For example control could be instigated by the person themselves 
(by being made aware there is a risk they may do something prejudicial) or by 
external social norms or rules, or by direct social pressure from other members of 
that person’s group.  
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Experiences of prejudice and stigmatisation 
There is a large literature on the way people experience prejudice, much of which is 
concerned with why it is that people may deny the discrimination that affects them 
(Abrams and Emler, 1992; compare Branscombe, 2004; Jost and Banaji, 1994; 
Major, Quinton and McCoy, 2002; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). The different themes  
in this literature emphasise different reasons why people might deny such 
disadvantage. It is painful to accept that one’s fate is in someone else’s hands.  
It may equally be comforting to sustain a belief that one has opportunities, should 
one wish to avail oneself of them. A further interpretation is that because of group 
insularity and possibly segregation, members of some disadvantaged groups mainly 
compare their situation with that of others within, rather than outside, their own 
group. As a result, the extent of disadvantage and difference is not their most 
pressing concern. One thing, however, is certain, and that is the importance of 
understanding the perspective of the individuals and groups who are subject to 
discrimination. This need to view both sides of the equation is highlighted by findings 
from surveys by Age Concern England (ACE) showing that, although the majority of 
people do not express negative attitudes about different age groups, ageism is the 
most commonly experienced form of prejudice against oneself (Ray, Sharp and 
Abrams, 2006; ACE, 2008). 
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Figure 2.7 shows the percentage of people in the National Survey of Prejudice (NSP) 
who (regardless of their own group membership) said they felt negative towards 
each of the equality strand categories and other groups. Respondents reacted most 
negatively towards illegal immigrants, with 61 per cent expressing negative feelings 
towards them. It is illuminating to compare this with Figure 2.8, which shows the 
proportion of respondents who reported experiencing prejudice against themselves, 
based on any of the six equality strand categories. 
 
Figure 2.7   Percentage of respondents who expressed negative feelings  
  towards different groups in the 2005 National Survey of Prejudice 
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Figure 2.8 shows that, of the six strand groups, older respondents reported 
experiencing the most prejudice (at 37 per cent). Prejudice based on gender was 
second highest (34 per cent). The least prejudice was reported in respect of disability 
and sexuality (15 per cent and 10 per cent respectively). Disparities between the 
levels of prejudice acknowledged by perpetrators and perceived by victims represent 
significant domains for potential conflict. However, these disparities do not 
necessarily result from ‘denial’ on one side or the other. Much research on the  
micro-dynamics of interracial interaction shows that minority group members detect 
quite well when majority group members have prejudicial implicit attitudes. Majority 
members may either be unaware of their own attitudes, or may be working hard to 
ensure they appear non-prejudiced. This in turn is detected by the person from a 
minority group who comes away from the situation feeling more stressed and 
devalued, whereas the one from the majority group may well believe the episode 
went well (see also Richeson and Shelton, 2007). One of the implications of this 
evidence is that it is important to tackle prejudice at both the explicit and the implicit 
levels of measurement or, more simply, to target as separate phenomena the way 
people feel they can behave and also the actual content of their stereotypes and 
negative assumptions about groups.  
 
Figure 2.8   Percentage of respondents in the 2005 National Survey of  
  Prejudice who experienced prejudice in the last 12 months,  
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Stereotype awareness and stereotype threat 
Stereotypes are not just images of groups but images that people believe are widely 
shared. This means that stereotypes can have an effect on our judgements and 
behaviour even if we do not agree with them. The way we use stereotypes can result 
in them becoming ‘confirmed’ both in our own minds and in the behaviour of the 
people to whom we apply them.  
 
For example, Abrams, Eller and Bryant (2006) conducted an experiment in which 
older people took a cognitive test. Half of the participants simply took the test, while 
the other half were informed that their performance would be compared with that of 
younger people. This reminded them indirectly of the stereotype that older people 
are less cognitively capable. The performance in the second group was substantially 
worse. The mechanism behind this phenomenon, stereotype threat (Steele, 1997), 
involves a combination of awareness of the negative stereotype of one’s group  
in contrast to that of another group, plus the anxiety and intrusive thoughts that 
interfere with performance. Self-stereotypes can also provide a boost (Rosenthal, 
Crisp and Suen, 2007; Walton and Cohen, 2003). For example, performance was 
enhanced among black athletes in the United States who thought they were being 
compared with white athletes, or whites who thought their maths ability was being 
compared with that of blacks (Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling and Darley, 1999). Therefore, 
it is not just the stereotype of one’s own group that matters but the expectations it 
produces when one’s group is compared with another group. 
 
Different aspects of engagement with prejudice can combine in different ways.  
For example, intergroup contact can help to prevent stereotype threat from 
happening. In Abrams, Eller and Bryant’s (2006) research the stereotype threat of  
a comparison with younger people only damaged the performance of older people 
who did not have positive intergenerational contact. Contact was also associated 
with less perceived difference between younger and older people. Encouragingly, 
Abrams, Crisp, Marques, Fagg, Bedford and Provias (2008) showed that merely 
asking older people to imagine pleasant contact with a younger person can eliminate 
stereotype threat. This evidence shows how engagement with prejudice can feed 
back into the bases of prejudice (for example, by changing how people view the 
social categories) to create a positive feedback cycle.  
 
2.5    Prejudice and the different equality strands 
The stereotype content model, as well as more traditional approaches to intergroup 
relations, highlights that specific intergroup relationships have unique histories and 
therefore unique problems underpinning prejudice within those relationships. This 
means that if we are to understand and evaluate the prevalence and causes of 
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prejudice in modern UK society we need to understand both what characterises 
prejudices towards different groups and how these prejudices might manifest 
themselves differently in forms of discrimination.  
 
Until recently, most researchers - as well as policy-makers - have tended to  
study each axis or strand of prejudice as a distinct phenomenon. Thus, the Equal 
Opportunities Commission prioritised equality issues relating to gender, and other 
commissions had their own priority strands. Organisations representing other strands 
(such as Stonewall and Age Concern England) also have their own priorities. 
Important though these different emphases are, they reflected and sustained a 
structural barrier to an integrated approach. Academia reflects these different 
emphases too, with specialisms in forms of prejudice (for example, women’s studies, 
international relations, ethnicity, religion).  
 
The difficulty from both a research and a policy point of view is that these separate 
approaches do not help to capture the balance among different aspects of identity 
and group membership that each of us, as individuals, embodies. The author  
is a non-disabled, middle-aged, heterosexual, white male atheist of multiple  
East European Jewish and Anglo-Saxon heritage. His day-to-day dealings with 
others involve similarly complex combinations (and more). It would seem inefficient 
to have to address each potential axis of prejudice and discrimination in a completely 
unique way. 
  
Practically speaking we would want to know what it is that promotes and prevents 
prejudicial attitudes based on various social category memberships, and how widely 
shared these expressions and experiences of prejudice are. In taking this approach 
we need first to focus on the major categories of group membership, namely those 
that others recognise and use to frame their interactions and relationships. Second 
we need to find a common set of indicators and metrics that tap into expressions and 
experiences of prejudice. Then we need to investigate in more detail the forms that 
these take and the circumstances in which they arise. 
 
Based on the preceding review, Table 2.2 sets out the likely bases of prejudice, the 
forms in which it often arises, and some of the factors that should moderate or alter 
levels of prejudice. The list is not exhaustive but is intended to capture some of the 
key variables that would need to be measured (in bold in the left hand column) in an 
effort to monitor and predict prejudice towards various groups in society. 
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2.6  Overall summary and conclusions 
Prejudice arises in an intergroup context. Many prejudices arise from the conflicting 
goals or demands that different groups have. Differences in social power and in the 
perceived legitimacy of economic and social status differences affect whether people 
see inequalities as discriminatory or unfair. Members of disadvantaged groups may 
either not be aware of their disadvantage or may be motivated to deny or ignore it. 
Similarly, members of advantaged groups may feel more comfortable with the belief 
that society is equal and each person achieves the status they deserve by dint of 
effort or ability. For this reason, understanding prejudice and its implications requires 
attention to the bases, manifestations and forms of engagement with prejudice. It 
cannot be assumed that, just because a group considers itself to be treated fairly or 
others regard it positively, it is actually escaping prejudice. 
 
Several powerful bases of prejudice have been identified through extensive 
research. When certain values are regarded as important this can focus people’s 
prejudices towards particular groups that appear to challenge or undermine those 
values. Discriminatory actions are sometimes ‘justified’ by claiming they uphold key 
values, such as security or meritocracy.  
 
Being viewed, and viewing oneself, as a member of a social category can be 
sufficient to generate biased perceptions and attitudes. Social categories are  
then imbued with meaning and people tend to focus on how their own and other 
categories differ in terms of values or behaviour that are important to them. 
Categorisation can create discrimination by reinforcing differences between people, 
and these can be manifested through physical as well as psychological segregation. 
Categories can be associated with powerful stereotypes which then affect the way 
members of those categories are judged. People also apply category-based 
stereotypes, including negative stereotypes, to themselves. This can affect their self-
image, or social identity, as well as their behaviour. Awareness of the role of 
categorisation in prejudice also highlights that prejudice can be reduced or redirected 
by either adding more complex categories or finding more widely shared categories 
to frame the way people judge one another. However, because people prefer to 
belong to groups that give them both a degree of distinctiveness (from other groups) 
as well as similarity (to others within their own group), strategies to redefine social 
categories to produce a simple common in-group are problematic. 
 
The role of identity is central in any analysis of prejudice. People generally feel 
positive and protective towards their own groups, and under some circumstances 
they may also feel negative or hostile towards out-groups. A potentially viable 
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approach to reducing prejudice is to promote in-group norms of tolerance and 
equality while also providing scope for distinctiveness. 
 
There are multiple manifestations of prejudices. Prejudices are not all the same. 
Some can be more directly blatant or ‘hostile’; others more subtle, implicit or even 
paternalistic. Likewise stereotypes that emphasise a group’s lack of warmth give  
rise to different prejudices from stereotypes that emphasise a group’s lack of ability. 
Stereotypes can then provide a basis for specific emotions towards particular 
groups, and these in turn are likely to motivate different behaviour. Groups that are 
stereotyped as low in competence and high in warmth are likely to attract sympathy 
but to be devalued in terms of what they can contribute to society. Part of tackling 
prejudice is identifying the types of emotions people feel towards a particular group 
and working on these. Some emotions are likely to be more counterproductive than 
others. For example, making people feel guilty about their group’s discriminatory 
behaviour might provoke defensive reactions rather than encouraging them to 
engage positively with the out-group. 
 
It is not the case that sheer group size determines how threatening that group 
appears to be or the prejudice directed against it. In many cases large groups of 
different backgrounds can share a space quite happily. Incidents such as racist 
murders may be more likely to reflect much more local situations that are specific  
to times and places. But one reason why such attacks and conflicts happen might  
be that people tend to view out-group members as less fully ‘human’ than in-group 
members. This indicates that an emphasis on perspective-taking and empathy might 
help to reduce prejudicial and discriminatory acts that are based on lack of insight.  
 
As well as being manifested through stereotypes, emotions, attitudes and direct 
evaluations of out-group members, prejudice is expressed powerfully through 
language. The level of complexity of the language used to depict, describe and 
explain the behaviour of out-groups tends to be simpler and more conditional  
than for in-groups.  
 
Engagement with prejudice takes several forms, too. The levels of people’s 
experiences of prejudice (such as ageism) can be very different from the prejudices 
they express directly. It also seems that majority and minority group members are 
likely to experience the same situation differently. Majority members may be 
comfortable with the idea that everyone is part of the same group. Minority members 
may experience this attitude as a form of prejudice or rejection of their own group. 
However, research has shown convincingly that contact between members of 
different groups, ideally in the form of friendships, can reduce prejudice. Contact is 
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often difficult to achieve but, promisingly, the research also shows that the effect of 
contact can be reproduced through largely psychological means.  
 
Prejudice is also amenable to social control and self-control. Social control 
(sometimes associated with political correctness) can either increase or inhibit 
prejudice by indicating to people whether it is ‘legitimate’ to hold and express 
negative views about a social group. Self-control can affect prejudice either because 
people want to receive social approval from others or because they have strongly 
held beliefs that they should not be prejudiced.   
 
Prejudice can be understood as a phenomenon involving a common set of social 
psychological processes. By understanding these processes we can measure, 
predict and perhaps prevent prejudice from occurring. Figure 2.9 summarises the 
preceding review. The intergroup context, or at least how people perceive the 
relationships among different groups in society, affects and is affected by the bases, 
manifestations and engagement with prejudice, but these also influence one another. 
In particular, the way people engage with prejudice can affect the bases of prejudice 
as well as the manifestations of prejudice. However, this is most likely to happen 
because of changes in the way people perceive intergroup relationships. If 
government, local authorities and organisations want to develop coherent and 
systematic approaches to tackling prejudice across equality strands, it would be 
advantageous to ensure that a common framework is employed within which these 
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3.   Measuring prejudice  
 
This chapter provides examples of questions that address the components of 
prejudice in Figure 2.9, drawn from surveys in the UK. Not all of those components, 
however, have been included in survey questions. 
 
3.1  Context of intergroup relations 
Knowing about the intergroup context is essential for understanding prejudice. 
Intergroup context involves the degree of inequality between groups, threat and 
conflict, status and power differences, and whether these have any legitimacy,  
as well as the extent of difference between groups. 
 
Some features of the intergroup context can be established from objective measures 
such as income and employment inequalities, or the legal basis for differences  
(for example, in employment rights, retirement or parental leave). Others lie more  
in the realm of people’s perceptions and beliefs, such as whether their own groups 
are at risk of losing their distinctive values, culture or status, and whether there  
are perceived conflicts of interests between groups. In principle, questions about 
intergroup context should focus on the comparative situation of specific groups (for 
example, Muslims and non-Muslims), a common technique in social psychological 
research. In practice, surveys have not generally asked for direct comparisons, and 
context has been measured more tangentially: for example, by asking respondents 
to evaluate one group in relation to society as a whole or through questions that 
focus on other components of prejudice, such as its manifestations.  
 
A recent example of a type of question that examines intergroup context in broad 
terms is the 2009 British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS), which included items 
regarding perceptions of public respect for people in five equality groups: 
 
How much do you agree or disagree that, in Britain, people generally treat 
each other with respect and consideration in public? (Scored on a scale of  
1 to 6; 1 being ‘agree strongly’ and 6 being ‘disagree strongly’.) 
 
Do you think there are particular groups of people in Britain who tend to treat 
others with a lack of respect and consideration in public? 
 
Which groups do you think tend to treat others in Britain with a lack of respect 
and consideration in public? (Young people, Middle-aged people, Old people, 
White people, Minority ethnic groups, People born in Britain, Immigrants, 
People in work, Unemployed people, Retired people, Rich people, Poor 
52 
MEASURING PREJUDICE 
people, Well educated people, Less well educated people, Men, Women, 
Other, Many groups/no particular group.) 
 
Respect is also an element of social stereotypes (for example, it is measured in the 
2008 European Social Survey (ESS) Round 4 module on Age Attitudes). However, 
aside from the ESS, surveys have not made systematic efforts to gauge perceptions 
of the relative power, status or distinctiveness of different social groups. The issue of 
people’s views of the legitimacy of differences between groups is sometimes picked 
up through indirect measures of prejudice, such as whether a more equal situation is 
desirable. For example, attitudes to employment equality for particular groups were 
examined in the National Survey of Prejudice (NSP) in 2005, which asked whether 
there should be greater employment equality for people in each of the six equality 
groups. This question implies a comparison with society as a whole and with other 
strands in particular: 
 
We want to ask your personal opinion about some changes that have been 
happening in this country over the years: Have attempts to give equal 
employment opportunities to: women/lesbians and gay men [Version A]; 
people over 70/Muslims [Version B]; disabled/black [Version C] people  
in this country gone too far or not far enough? 
 
1  Gone much too far 
2  Gone too far 
3  About right 
4  Not gone far enough 
5  Not gone nearly far enough 
 
Perceived threat has also been measured in various surveys, although it should be 
noted that threats can be both economic and symbolic. For example, Age Concern 
England (ACE)’s 2004 survey included an item looking at symbolic intergroup threat: 
 
How are people over 70 affecting the customs, traditions and way of life of 
other people...? (Scored on a six-point scale: much worse, slightly worse,  
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The ACE 2006 survey included another question examining economic threat: 
 
People who live in this country generally work and pay taxes at some 
points in their lives. They also use health and welfare services. 
On balance, how much more or less do you think that people over 70 
take out from the economy than they have put in over their lifetime? 
 
1  Take out a lot more than they have put in 
2  Take a bit more than they have put in 
3  Put a bit more in than they have taken out 
4  Put a lot more in than they have taken out 
5  None of these 
 
3.2  Bases of prejudice 
Psychological bases of prejudice include the way people apply categories to divide 
others into different social groups, how people identify themselves with certain 
groups, the values that people apply to their judgements about differences between 
groups, and individual personality and motivations that can affect people’s views on 
diversity and inclusion of others from outside their own social groups.  
 
Categorisation 
Most surveys collect some demographic information about categories to which 
people belong, such as gender, age, ethnicity, disability or religion. However, we 
cannot take it for granted that these different categories carry equal weight in 
people’s attitudes and perceptions of one another, nor that census-based categories 
map closely with the way people apply categories in their everyday lives. 
 
As an example of how to measure people’s use of categorisation, ACE’s 2004/2006 
surveys and the 2008 ESS employed items exploring how people categorise age 
groups. Respondents were asked the following open-ended questions: 
 
When (at what age) do people stop being young?  
 
When does old age start?  
 
A further aspect of categorisation is how people classify themselves. Note that, 
psychologically, self-categorisation is not necessarily the same as ‘identity’. People 
can be aware that they belong to a social category but not have a strong sense of 




Some people think of themselves first as British. Others may think of 
themselves first as English. Which, if any, of the following best describes  
how you see yourself? (Scored on a 1 [English not British] to 5 [British not 
English] scale.) 
 
However, such items need to be interpreted with caution. The example above 
assumes that ‘British’ and ‘English’ fall on opposite ends of a single continuum, 
whereas one category (English) is actually subordinate to the other (British).  
It is perfectly possible that a person might think of themselves as fully English  
and fully British at the same time. 
 
Social identity 
The BSAS 2005 focused on British and regional identity. Items related to a large 
number of social categories, including, for instance, self-defined religious or ethnic 
in-groups. Some measures focused on perceptions of similarity between the 
respondent and various groups. 
  
How much do you feel you have in common with…?  
(Range of social categories) 
 
Conceptually, this type of measure of perceived similarity falls somewhere between 
self-categorisation and identification because it is possible to have much in common 
with a group without either belonging to it or identifying with it. However, empirically, 
it is also true that when people identify with a group they are likely to feel they have 
much in common with other members. 
 
More direct measures of identification focus on the feeling of attachment to a group. 
For example, the ESS 2008 included an item about age identification that asked how 
strong a sense of belonging people had with their age group: 
 
Please tell me if you have a strong or weak sense of belonging to this age 
group. Choose your answer from this card where 0 means a very weak sense 
of belonging and 10 means a very strong sense of belonging. 
 
Values 
The values individuals hold relate to the things that they consider important in their 
lives, such as equality, respect for tradition and social justice. Both actual and 
perceived difference in values held by different groups can be a basis for intergroup 
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A question in the 2007 Eurobarometer (EB) survey focused on cultural values. 
 
Participants were given a list of nine values and asked to ‘choose which –  
up to a maximum of three – they would prefer to preserve and reinforce in 
society’. The values included: social equality and solidarity; freedom of 
opinion; tolerance and openness to others; cultural diversity. 
 
The NSP 2005 included a reduced version of the Schwartz Values Scale (Schwartz, 
1992, 2007), presenting items on beliefs about equality and differences between 
groups. For example, regarding the value of obedience and conformity, participants 
were asked the following questions: 
 
I think people should follow rules at all times, even when no one is watching.  
(Scored on a scale of 1 to 6; 1 being ‘not at all like me’ and 6 being ‘very 
much like me’.) 
 
I think it is best to do things in traditional ways. 
 
Personality and personal motivation 
Personality is rarely measured in general surveys, in part because of the 
considerable number of items required for reliable assessment. Thus it is not 
surprising that personality does not appear in the surveys covered in this review. 
There are numerous personality characteristics that may be linked to various 
prejudices, of which the perhaps most well-known is authoritarianism, likely to be 
measured with the Right Wing Authoritarianism scale. However, some areas of 
psychological assessment cross between personality and attitudes. As an example, 
social dominance orientation (SDO) describes a personal preference for hierarchies 
which leads to discrimination. Those that score high on SDO tend to favour social 
dominance and may in turn condone discriminatory practices that maintain these 
social hierarchies. SDO can also be regarded as a manifestation of prejudice when  
it is applied to a specific group. For example, when a society is under strain, some 
people might react by expressing a higher social dominance orientation. Although 
the full measurement scales for SDO are too long to be of practical use in surveys, 
psychologists are developing short versions. 
 
3.3  Manifestations of prejudice 
Manifestations of prejudice include the use of stereotypes, overt prejudice and 
hostility, social distance, disclosure, trust and reciprocity, and the expression of 
paternalistic attitudes. Prejudice can be direct (explicit and controlled) or indirect 




Stereotypes derive from the process of using social categories and are used to  
make judgements about ourselves and others based on group membership.  
They can include both ‘personal’ and ‘social’ stereotypes. 
 
Asking about personal stereotypes may require large sets of items (for example,  
a wide array of characteristics that different people might believe to be linked with  
a particular group). Because the detailed stereotypes of different groups are very 
distinct, it is unlikely to be practical to measure these for more than two groups  
in one survey. However, all stereotypes have some common elements and it is 
possible to examine these elements across multiple groups. This has been done  
for measurements of social stereotypes. Social stereotypes are those that people 
believe are held widely. For example, based on Fiske et al.’s (2002) stereotype 
content model (which can be generalised for use with any societal group), the ACE 
surveys used the following items relating to ageing stereotypes: 
 
To what extent do you think that other people in this country view people  







(Scored on a scale of 1 to 5; 1 being ‘extremely unlikely to be viewed this way’ 
and 5 being ‘extremely likely to be viewed this way’.) 
 
Note that these items can detect both traditionally ‘hostile’ prejudiced stereotypes 
(such as that a group is viewed as unfriendly and incapable, and is not admired but 
might be envied) and more ‘benevolent’ or paternalistic aspects (such as that a 
group is viewed as friendly but incapable and deserving of pity). 
 
Social distance 
Another commonly used measure of prejudice is that of social distance, which is the 
idea of how positively or negatively respondents react to varying levels of closeness 
and intimacy with members of a particular group (Bogardus, 1933). This is frequently 
measured by asking people how they would feel about members of particular groups 
being, for instance, their boss, doctor or neighbour, or being married to a close 
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For example, a Stonewall survey (2003) employed the following item directly 
measuring social distance in terms of ethnicity, sexuality and disability: 
 
How comfortable, or uncomfortable, would you personally feel if your  
1) GP, 2) teacher or teacher of a close relative, 3) boss in a new job,  
4) partner of a close relative or friend, or 5) pub with customers were... 
from a different ethnic group to your own 
gay or lesbian 
disabled  
 
Ray, Sharp and Abrams’ 2006 survey for ACE included an item focusing on age: 
 
How comfortable or uncomfortable do you think you would feel if a  
suitably qualified person [over 70/under 30] was appointed as your boss? 
(Scored on a five-point scale: very comfortable, comfortable, neither, 
uncomfortable, very uncomfortable.) 
 
The Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey asks respondents extensively about 
political, interdenominational and related social attitudes. This survey provides 
detailed coverage of social distance.  
 
If you had a choice, would you prefer to live in a neighbourhood with people  
of only your own religion, or in a mixed-religion neighbourhood?  (Response 
options of ‘own religion only’, ‘mixed religion neighbourhood’, ‘other’ or ‘don’t 
know’.) 
 
The European Social Survey included a similar item:  
 
Would you prefer to live in an area where nobody / some / many were of a 
different race or ethnic group from most people in that country? 
 
More indirectly, the BSAS 2003 employed an item indirectly relating to social 
distance at work.  
 
Do you think most white people in Britain would mind if a suitably qualified 
person of black or West Indian origin were appointed as their boss?  
 
While social distance measures have been around for over 70 years, they only 
assess one aspect of prejudice. They do not enable us to know why people desire 
distance, and whether the underlying reason is prejudice. For example, there may be 
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aspects of unfamiliarity, fear, cultural or religious reasons, or social conventions and 
norms that might affect people’s responses to social distance measures. Therefore, 
these alone do not constitute a sufficient index of prejudice. 
 
Overt prejudice and hostility 
Measures of direct or overt prejudice require people to report their attitudes towards 
various groups. These measures assume that people are aware of their attitudes 
and are willing to disclose them (Olson, 2009). The explicit nature of these measures 
does, however, make them vulnerable to social desirability concerns, because 
people may be reluctant to express a prejudiced attitude that they know to be 
socially undesirable. This makes it difficult to distinguish between people who are 
genuinely low in prejudice and people who are prejudiced but are motivated not to 
appear so. There are, nonetheless, advantages to using overt measures of 
prejudice. They are easy for respondents to understand and easy for researchers  
to interpret.  
 
For example, the NSP 2005 employed an item relating to overt, direct prejudice 
towards various groups in Britain, including people in various equality groups. 
 
How negative or positive do you feel towards:  
Women 
Men 
People under 30 








(Scored on a scale of -2 very negative to +2 very positive.) 
 
A commonly used approach is that adopted by the BSAS, which asks people to 
describe their own level of prejudice. 
 
How would you describe yourself? As… (Scored using one of five options: 
‘prejudiced against people of other races’, ‘a little prejudiced’, ‘not prejudiced 
at all’, ‘other’, ‘don’t know’, and ‘refusal’.) 
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The typically low levels of people who say they are prejudiced illustrates a drawback 
of this type of measure, namely that it confuses actual prejudice with whether or not 
people want to label themselves as prejudiced. It also does not permit respondents 
an opportunity to provide any caveats (for example, that they feel prejudiced against 
only one particular race, or that they feel prejudiced in favour of one race but not 
against any). For this reason the measure seems unlikely to be sufficiently sensitive. 
 
Subtle and implicit forms of prejudice 
Using more subtle measures can help to avoid some of the social desirability 
problems of direct measurement. Subtle questions can focus on perceived cultural 
differences or differences in traditional values (see Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995), 
and more generally they will assess the idea that any inequalities that disfavour a 
group are acceptable or are the responsibility of that group in an otherwise fair 
system. One manifestation of this is system justification. For example, the ESS 
contains the following item: 
 
It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and 
traditions. 
 
Another example of subtle prejudice is in the ACE (2006) survey, which used a 
question relating to views and attitudes towards equal opportunities for people over 
the age of 70: 
 
Have attempts to give equal employment opportunities to people over 70 in 
this country gone too far or not far enough? (Much too far, too far, about right, 
not far enough, not nearly far enough, don’t know.) 
 
Like system justification, this item partially involves the intergroup context, but it also 
indirectly measures prejudice because the view that equality has gone ‘too far’ 
implies that the respondent would prefer a greater degree of inequality.  
 
An alternative approach would be to employ measures that evaluate prejudiced 
attitudes by tapping into spontaneous cognitive processes. Measuring implicit 
attitudes towards prejudice using computer-based timed response tasks is 
technically more complex than measuring explicit attitudes, but is certainly 
achievable using computer-assisted interviews or online surveys. Such techniques 
can help to bypass a person’s motive to express only those attitudes that they  
think are socially acceptable (for example, to an interviewer). They can give an 
accurate picture of attitudes that may have discriminatory implications but which  
the respondent may not even be aware of. However, it is also important to be aware 
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that such implicit measures are likely to predict distinct types of behavioural 
manifestations of prejudice (for example, non-verbal and spontaneous reactions to 
members of particular groups) whereas more overt verbal measures of prejudice are 
likely to predict manifestations over which people have a degree of control or that are 
influenced heavily by social norms. Therefore, implicit measures offer an additional 
rather than alternative means of assessing prejudice. The inclusion of implicit 
measures of prejudice is an avenue yet to be developed in UK surveys. 
 
3.4 Engagement with prejudice 
Engagement refers to the forms in which people believe they may experience and 
react to prejudice as well as whether and when they might express it. It also refers to 
their active connection with groups in society that might be the targets of their own 
and others’ prejudices. Engagement with prejudice includes experiences of prejudice 
in social interactions (explicit and unspoken, personal and generic, and intended and 
unintended), as well as people’s intergroup contact and their self-conscious efforts to 
avoid being prejudiced.   
 
Experience of prejudice 
The subjective experience of prejudice is diverse and complex. People may  
perceive their experiences of prejudice differently depending on whom they compare 
themselves with, the circumstances under which these comparisons occur, and 
perceptions of fairness. Understanding the perspective of those who are subject to 
prejudice is of key importance given that there appears to be incongruity between 
the groups that people believe are the victims of prejudice and the self-reports of 
people’s experiences of prejudice against themselves.  
 
Measures have varied in how they assess experiences of prejudice. Some ask 
respondents directly whether they have been the targets of prejudice. The measure 
shown here is taken from ACE 2006. 
 
In the past year, how often, if at all, has anyone shown prejudice against you 
or treated you unfairly... 
 
because of your gender (male or female) 
because of your age 
because of your religion 
because of your race or ethnic background 
because of any disability you may have 
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The Home Office Citizenship Survey asked, similarly:   
 
Have you been turned down for a job in the last five years? If so was your 
gender, age, race, religion or colour, or area of residence the reason?  
 
The 2007 Eurobarometer asked respondents whether, during the past two years, 
they felt they had been discriminated against (and on what grounds), whether they 
had witnessed someone else being discriminated against, whether they felt such 
discrimination could be right or wrong, and whether they would expect other people 
to feel such discrimination could be right or wrong:  
 
at work (including seeking work and opportunities for promotion) 
in education (separately for experiences in primary, secondary and university 
level) 
seeking housing 
accessing services (restaurants, shops or insurance companies)  
 
The wording of general questions of experiences of prejudice is crucial. Specifically, 
the wording in the ACE and NSP research - which asks whether prejudice has been 
experienced ‘because of your [age, sex etc]’ - gives much higher prevalence rates 
than questions in surveys such as the European Social Survey, which ask whether 
the respondent belongs to ‘a group’ that experiences prejudice. 
 
The Home Office Citizenship Survey included the even more specific question:   
 
Have you been turned down for a job in the last five years? If so, was your 
gender, age, race, religion or colour, or area of residence the reason? 
 
Other surveys have sometimes taken a less direct approach, asking instead about 
awareness of prejudice being expressed against others (who may or may not share 
a social group membership with the respondent). An example of people’s views 
about prejudice towards others is in BSAS 2003:  
 
In the last five years have you been aware of your employer treating an 
employee unfairly because of their…  
age 
disability 
race or ethnicity 




(Respondents had the option to indicate ‘yes’ or ‘no’. If yes, they were asked 
to specify in which aspects of the work experience this had occurred.) 
 
In 2008 Stonewall asked young people from Great Britain who are lesbian, gay or 
bisexual (LGB), or think they might be, to complete a survey about their experiences 
at school (Hunt and Jensen, 2008). The following question is about prejudice 
towards LGB people in general: 
 
How often do you hear anti-gay remarks used in school? (Never, rarely, 
sometimes, often, frequently.) 
 
The direct and indirect questions have different advantages but they also measure 
distinct things. The direct approach relies on respondents having insight into whether 
a social group, or category, membership was the reason why they were subjected to 
prejudice (for example, being turned down for a job). Arguably, people may either 
lack the necessary information or simply be inaccurate when making such 
judgements. However, experimental research suggests that members of groups that 
are lower in status or power are likely both to be vigilant and relatively more accurate 
than are members of groups that are higher in status or power. Additionally, it can be 
argued that people’s perceptions are just as important as objective reality in terms of 
the implications for their reactions to such experiences. The indirect approach may 
make it easier for people to report instances of prejudice that involve themselves 
without having to admit openly to victimisation. However, the indirect approach does 
not distinguish between people who are simply accurate observers of prejudice and 
those who are subjected to prejudice.  
 
Intergroup contact 
Intergroup contact has been shown to promote positive intergroup attitudes, provided 
certain optimal conditions are met (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Contact can arise in 
many different forms, which creates a challenge when formulating questions that are 
sufficiently inclusive but also sufficiently precise. It is also important to distinguish 
between measures of the quantity of contact and those that measure its quality.  
 
Quantity measures indicate whether people have an opportunity to observe directly 
or learn about other groups. For example, the Stonewall 2003 survey used an item 
asking about quantity of intergroup contact.   
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Quality measures indicate the existence of positive or close relationships with people 
from other groups. It has been argued that any such high-quality contact is likely to 
promote more positive intergroup attitudes. For example, the ESS has included 
questions about friends from other countries and related social distance measures 
about areas in which respondents would prefer to live. 
 
Do you have any friends who have come from [a relevant foreign country]? 
 
ACE 2006 included items asking about intergroup contact that take into account the 
degree of quality of contact.  
 
Indicate whether you… 
have a close friend 
have a friend 
personally know at least one person 
meet people but don’t know any personally 
rarely or never meet people 
…in the age group over 70 [and under 30].  
 
Control over prejudice 
The fact that prejudices can be manifested in a variety of ways, including implicit and 
indirect forms, suggests that there may be times when people are not able to control 
their prejudices, even when the social climate motivates them to do so. Because 
people experience social pressure to be egalitarian and not to appear prejudiced,  
we cannot assume that answers to direct questions about prejudice should be taken 
at face value. For this reason it is useful to evaluate how motivated people are to 
appear unprejudiced, and whether this motivation stems from a desire to be socially 
acceptable or from a genuine aspiration to be unprejudiced.  
 
Measures of control over prejudice help to reflect current social norms and 
expectations. For example, the NSP 2005 survey measured both the personal 
aspiration and socially desirable aspects of people’s motivation to control their 
prejudice generally: 
 
I attempt to act in non-prejudiced ways towards other groups because  
it is personally important to me. 
 
I try to appear non-prejudiced towards other groups in order to avoid 
disapproval from others.  





Perhaps surprisingly, answers to these two questions are not highly correlated, 
which confirms that people do regard their private views about being prejudiced to be 
distinct from their compliance with social norms about prejudice. Changes over time 
in people’s responses to these questions can shed light on how social norms and 
private attitudes about prejudice may be converging or diverging. These items can 
readily be adapted to focus on particular groups (for example, in the ESS Round 4 
age module).  
 
Some survey questions focus on people’s likely tolerance for legislation or practices 
to tackle prejudice. The Scottish Social Attitudes Survey had a section tapping into 
social pressures to control prejudice on a national level.  
 
Should Scotland do all it can to get rid of prejudice?  
 
The ESS also explored views about institutional controls over prejudice.  
 
Would it be good or bad to have a law against promoting racial or ethnic 
hatred? 
 
3.5 Overall coverage of components 
Table 3.1 summarises the extent to which each of the components of prejudice have 
been examined in the various surveys that were included in this review.   
 
Whereas surveys generally cover some aspects of the context of intergroup 
relations, this tends to be more thorough when multiple equality strands are also 
being compared (indicated in the second and third columns). Surprisingly few of the 
surveys provided substantial measurement of the bases of prejudice, exceptions 
being the ACE 2004/6 surveys and NSP. In future research, greater attention needs 
to be paid to this component. 
 
Although manifestations of prejudice have been measured in all but two of these 
surveys, the measurement has been relatively superficial and leaves important gaps 
in our capacity to describe British people’s prejudices. A similar pattern emerges for 
the measurement of engagement with prejudice. Although all but three of the 
surveys examined explored some aspect of engagement, the measures have been 
limited in number and depth.  
 
With the exception of the NSP, the majority of surveys have focused only on specific 
strands or pairs of strands, resulting in very little evidence that is directly comparable 
across the six strands. 
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Table 3.1  Breadth and depth of coverage of prejudice towards equality  



















A GSERAD, A √√ √√ √√ √√ 
British Crime 
Survey ER ER, A √  √ √√ 
British 
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GSERAD ER √ √ √ √ 
European 

















√√ √√ √√ √√ 
NSP Follow-
up 





GSED GSED √√ √√  √ 
Stonewall 
2003 SEAD GSERAD   √ √ 
Stonewall 
2008  S GSERAD √√ √ √ √√ 
Notes to Table 3.1:  
* G = Gender, S = Sexuality, E = Ethnicity, R = Religion, A = Age, D = Disability.  
If different rounds or versions of the survey focused on different equality strands, 
these separate instances are separated by commas.  
** An empty box indicates no coverage of that component, one tick indicates some 






This brief summary shows that prejudice has been researched using a range of 
different measures, applied in different formats and orientated towards different 
groups in society. There are significant gaps in coverage of the different components 
of prejudice (context, bases, manifestations and engagement). There is also 
inconsistency and incompleteness concerning equality strands: even when there  
has been sufficient depth of measurement, it has rarely encompassed more than  
one or two equality strands. When taken together, the surveys provide a very patchy 
evidence base for benchmarking prejudice or evaluating change. This is primarily 
because there has not been an overarching conceptual framework for measuring 
prejudice. At present, the available evidence severely limits the conclusions that may 
be drawn about changes over time.   
 
A reliable and practical measurement of the components of prejudice and in relation 
to the different equality strands is needed to analyse the status and development of 
prejudice in Britain, and also as a tool to predict and prevent prejudice. 
Establishment of a systematic measurement framework will make it easier to 
develop policies and interventions within and across strands, and to justify priorities 
attached to prejudice reduction for different equality strands and other groups.  
This is not to argue that a common measurement framework will be a complete 
solution. Clearly, detailed evidence is required to properly understand any particular 
axis of prejudice. However, it will be easier to develop such detailed analyses with a 
well-structured frame of reference as a starting point.   
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4.   Can prejudice be stopped? 
 
What hard evidence is there for ways of reducing prejudice among people in the UK? 
This section considers recent work that has employed social psychology-based 
methods to identify the causes of prejudice and intervene to reduce prejudice. 
Because much of the relevant UK research is funded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) and because some of that research is not yet published, 
grant numbers are given for reference purposes. This work tends to consider the 
intergroup context and aspects of engagement as critical; the studies either 
manipulate engagement or measure it longitudinally to see how it affects the bases 
and manifestations of prejudice. 
 
4.1 Longitudinal evidence 
Generally, there is a dearth of good-quality longitudinal research on prejudice or 
prejudice reduction. The ESRC has recently funded some important studies, mainly 
conducted within schools. A good deal of this work has concentrated on racism  
and interethnic attitudes, though some has considered other equality strands.  
No cross-strand longitudinal evidence has been identified. 
 
Brown and colleagues (ESRC R000-23-0041, see Binder et al., unpublished) 
assembled samples of high school students from Belgium, England and Germany 
and examined how the amount and quality of contact with various majority or 
minority out-groups (for example, Turkish people in Germany) was related to 
prejudice over a six-month period. The research showed that contact reduced 
prejudice but prejudice also inhibited contact. The effects of contact were stronger 
when the out-group members were seen to be typical of their group. This and other 
work has also shown that contact has a stronger effect on the prejudices held by 
members of majority groups than on those of minority groups (see Eller and Abrams, 
2003, 2004, on studies of Mexican/American contact). Also, consistent with previous 
research findings, contact reduced prejudice in part because contact reduced 
intergroup anxiety.  
 
Brown, Rutland and Watters (ESRC RES-148-25-0007) examined acculturation 
among children using Berry’s bi-dimensional acculturation model (Berry, 1994).  
This model encompasses two orientations: the degree to which children value  
their own ethnic culture and the worth they place on maintaining relationships with 
the majority ethnic group. Children can be classified as ‘high’ or ‘low’ on each 
orientation, resulting in the acculturation orientations of ‘integration’ (high on both), 
‘assimilation’ (low, high), ‘separation’ (high, low) and ‘marginalisation’ (low, low).  
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Participants were 218 British South-Asian children aged between five and 11 years, 
recruited from low (less than 20 per cent ethnic minority) and high (20 per cent ethnic 
minority, or higher) ethnically diverse schools in semi-urban lower-middle-class 
areas within the south east of England outside a major metropolitan city. The 
children were interviewed individually with structured questionnaires at three time 
points six months apart. The research measured acculturation orientation, ethnic  
and national identification, peer rejection, cross-group friendship, experience of 
discrimination, self-esteem and teachers' ratings of children’s emotional and 
behavioural problems. Over time, greater school ethnic diversity was associated  
with increases in children’s self-esteem, more balanced cross-group friendships,  
and fewer emotional and behavioural problems. Children with more ‘integrationist’ 
acculturation orientations at the start showed higher peer acceptance and self-
esteem over time but also showed more social-emotional problems and experience 
of discrimination. The findings suggest a positive effect of school ethnic diversity and 
‘integrationist’ acculturation orientations for the social-emotional adaptation of ethnic 
minority children, but also highlight the need to provide additional social support to 
ethnic minority children (Cameron, Rutland, Brown, Hossain, Landau, Le Touze, 
Nigbur and Watters, 2009).   
 
Longitudinal evidence is important but rare. However, such evidence is often limited 
by the fact that samples are not representative, being drawn from particular schools 
rather than the population as a whole. Longitudinal research with representative 
samples has been conducted in Germany by Wagner and colleagues, through the 
GFE (Group-Focused Enmity in Europe) project. This examined the attitudes of  
non-immigrant German adults (samples ranging from 2,700 to 1,760) between 2002 
and 2007. The research also examined a longitudinal panel of 521 between 2002 
and 2006. Analyses of these data showed a clear causal path from prejudice 
towards immigrants to approval of violence towards them, though the item 
measuring this was slightly strange: ‘If others take too much space, one should show 
them by the use of violence who is master in one’s house’ (Wagner, Christ and 
Pettigrew, 2008). Moreover, between 2002 and 2006, there was a clear effect of 
positive contact on reduced intergroup bias. 
 
Summary 
Longitudinal research provides a clear picture: intergroup contact and school 
diversity tend to be associated with improved intergroup understanding and  
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4.2 Persuasive messages 
The potential for media campaigns to reduce prejudice has been reviewed by Sutton, 
Perry, Parke and John-Baptiste (2007). This review drew extensively on mainstream 
social psychological research to derive principles for effective campaigning but, 
perhaps more importantly, highlighted that such campaigns are always embedded  
in a social context, which means their effects may be difficult to determine. A 
methodology for judging the potential for ‘realist evaluations’ is proposed in the 
review. A further important observation is that there is little evidence that media 
campaigns can be effective. The lack of evidence is as much due to poor 
methodology as inadequate media strategies.  
 
Social psychologists have come up with several other methods for influencing 
people. Indeed, media messages are probably not the most efficient. Instead, based 
on the extensive literature on intergroup relations and group processes, it is worth 
reminding ourselves that normative pressure can be incredibly effective. There are  
at least two general mechanisms for this: informational and normative influence. 
Essentially these boil down to being genuinely persuaded and being prepared to go 
along with what others say or do. Importantly, once a public consensus is apparent, 
people are likely to become persuaded. That is, group rationality replaces logic or 
individual rationality. This is why extremist groups are able to inculcate radical 
agendas and perspectives. However, exactly the same persuasion mechanisms 
should be able to work in reducing prejudice. Indeed, groups become more 
persuasive if we identify with them and less persuasive if we see them as out-groups 
(see Abrams and Hogg, 1990, for a review). For this reason, if an attempt at 
persuasion comes from outside our own group, we are likely to challenge or reject 
the ideas out of hand. As with prejudice generally, a key to progress is to find a 
connection with the people we want to persuade. Space does not permit a detailed 
exploration of intergroup attitude change research, but some examples of this and 
other intervention experiments demonstrate that there is a variety of means at our 
disposal for combating prejudice and promoting good relations. 
 
ESRC-funded research by Maio and colleagues has investigated how people 
respond to anti-racist messages presented in either print or audio-visual media. 
People with ambivalent attitudes to ethnic minorities take more time to read 
messages about the group (Maio, Greenland, Bernard and Esses, 2001), but the 
consequences of this greater attention can be unexpected. When people were 
exposed to messages that supported ethnic minorities, people who started with 
ambivalent attitudes expressed more prejudice whereas those who did not hold 
ambivalent attitudes became less prejudiced. These experimental studies show that 
such messages can sometimes work and sometimes backfire, particularly among 
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people who are ambivalent in the first place. Moreover, even when people are 
explicitly more positive towards ethnic minority people (suggesting public compliance 
with such messages) measures of implicit attitudes show that these messages result 
in more negative rather than positive attitudes. It also seems that positive shifts in 
overtly expressed attitudes are not always matched by shifts in implicit attitudes.  
 
The paradigms used in these studies tended to ask participants for views about 
‘ethnic minorities’ and it is not clear whether people were ambivalent because they 
felt differently about different minorities, or whether they were ambivalent because 
they had a mixture of positive and negative attitudes towards all minorities. These 
studies are a useful start, but the results are complex and do not seem easily 
generalisable at this point. For example, in an experiment conducted after the 
September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center, participants read an editorial 
that advocated increased or reduced immigration of Muslims, or a neutral editorial on 
a different topic. After reading the pro-immigration article, those who had previously 
been favourable towards Muslims showed more implicit prejudice, whereas those 
who had previously been unfavourable showed reduced implicit prejudice (Maio, 
Watt, Hewstone and Rees, 2002). However, the available evidence is not sufficiently 
focused to provide a clear answer as to whether media-based persuasion is likely to 
be an effective tool for reducing prejudices. 
 
Maio and Olson (1998) proposed that values that are widely accepted are treated as 
‘truisms’, in that they are rarely questioned and people lack clear lines of argument to 
justify them. As a result values have stronger affective (emotional) than behavioural 
implications. Maio’s work showed that when people are asked to articulate reasons 
for holding their values it becomes more likely that they will also behave in 
accordance with them. From this it can be inferred that getting people to explain  
and justify values such as equality will also lead them to behave in more egalitarian 
and less prejudiced ways. Research remains to be conducted to test this possibility, 
but many theories and related evidence in social psychology would point to  
this conclusion.  
 
Summary 
Aiming persuasive messages at people is potentially risky because those with 
different values or attitudes at the start are liable to respond quite differently to the 
same message. The lesson from this research is that before persuasive campaigns 
are rolled out it is essential to be clear who they are aimed at and what effects are 
intended, as well as what effects are to be avoided. These potential effects need to 
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4.3 Diversity training 
Pendry, Driscoll and Field (2007) conducted a review of diversity training 
effectiveness. They argue that adherence to the principles of established social 
psychological theory can guide the development of diversity initiatives and make  
it more coherent, and that the evaluation of such initiatives can also inform theory 
and research. As they point out, the difficulty is that impacts of interventions under 
controlled conditions (for example, in the laboratory and when university students are 
the research participants) can be overwhelmed or transformed in the much ‘noisier’ 
and more complex situations in which people conduct their daily lives. However, 
research does show how and why diversity training runs the risk of backlash. 
Confronted with their own prejudices, people are likely to become defensive and 
angry, or if they become guilty they may merely decide to avoid the issue. 
Nonetheless, some strategies seem more promising than others. 
 
Pendry, Driscoll and Field (2007) consider several different approaches to diversity 
training. One is the informative/enlightenment approach – the idea that telling people 
about inequalities or injustices between groups and about the advantages of 
diversity will naturally lead to more positive attitudes. Unfortunately this approach 
ignores the fact that prejudice is underpinned by emotions that are frequently 
resistant to rational argument (Dovidio,  Gaertner, Stewart, Esses and ten Vergert, 
2004; Shavitt, 1990). Indeed, as mentioned in the discussion of emotions earlier, 
people who identify strongly with their group are likely to react by identifying even 
more strongly and to feel more hostile towards an out-group if they are being made 
to feel guilty about their own group’s actions or position (Doosje, Spears and 
Ellemers, 2002; Mackie, Devos and Smith, 2000). Another approach is to argue that 
people should be ‘colour-blind’, and effectively treat everyone as individuals. But this 
can also be problematic as it poses a threat to important identities.  
 
The use of empathy and perspective-taking seems to hold some promise. For 
example, Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) found reduced stereotyping of elderly 
people by students if those students were asked to take the perspective of an elderly 
person. Other more direct approaches have questionable outcomes. Pendry, Driscoll 
and Field (2007) discuss the ‘Walking Through White Privilege’ approach (McIntosh, 
1988) which makes majority group advantages manifest, but risks causing increased 
separation and resentment between groups. Pendry, Driscoll and Field (2007) state 
that ‘what we have commonly found is that participants with no prior exposure to 
such diversity issues will often get “stopped” by their anger and / or guilt response, 
and such defensive responses make it difficult to progress’ (p16). Moreover, among 
minority group participants the exercise may simply reinforce the level of inequality 
and discrimination in society. 
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Along similar lines, the Blue Eyes/Brown Eyes method developed by Jane Elliot, 
which divides people according to eye colour and then simulates arbitrary prejudices 
that are introduced by the session facilitator, also risks backfiring. An analysis by 
Stewart, LaDuke, Bracht, Sweet and Gamarel (2003) of the effects of this eight-hour 
process showed that, while the exercise heightens emotions, the reactions are 
generally negative rather than positive, and there is no long-term impact. Pendry, 
Driscoll and Field (2007) suggest that the method is too brutal and potentially 
unethical, and that subtler approaches such as simpler perspective-taking exercises, 
or even watching a dramatisation of the exercise, may be more fruitful. In particular, 
it seems likely that methods that induce anger rather than guilt or responsibility are 
unlikely to have lasting positive effects (Tatum, 1997). A recent exercise conducted 
by Jane Elliot in the UK, screened as part of a Channel 4 2009 series on race, 
showed that some individuals strongly challenged the premise that they might be 
prejudiced (Abrams, 2009). However, as the outcomes have not been systematically 
evaluated, further research is required to be confident about which methods will  
work best. 
 
Another approach is to make people aware of their unconscious or automatic biases, 
for example by having them take an Implicit Association Test (IAT), which can be 
taken via a website. However, according to Pendry, Driscoll and Field (2007), this 
becomes problematic because people find the method difficult to understand and  
are likely to challenge the interpretation of the results. One way to circumvent such 
reactions is to put participants in the role of trainers: that is, to stand back from the 
results and articulate what the IAT demonstrates. This author believes the downside 
of such a method is that it also allows the person to put themselves ‘above’ their 
prejudices. A further, more serious, problem is that there is still substantial debate 
within psychology as to what the IAT actually measures.  
 
A simpler method is the ‘father-son exercise’ in which people are asked to explain 
how the parent of an accident victim can be the surgeon treating the son, given  
that the father was killed in the accident. A proportion of people erroneously seek 
complex explanations for this situation, overlooking the possibility that the surgeon 
could be the son’s mother. As a group exercise this illustrates how easily people 
automatically make stereotype-based assumptions and raises in a non-threatening 
way the importance of holding such stereotypes in abeyance. An additional method 
is to ask people to consider positive and negative behaviours and ask how often  
in-group or out-group members engage in them. People typically come up with more 
positives for in-group members, and when this is demonstrated in a group exercise  
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Although the translation of social psychological experiments into group 
demonstrations offers promise as a method for diversity training, there is a potential 
pitfall. According to Pendry, Driscoll and Field (2007), unless participants are 
motivated to embrace diversity, ‘such programmes are likely to fail, or even heighten 
existing intergroup tensions’ (p. 43). Such motivation can be increased in various 
ways, particularly through social norms or institutional backing. If an organisation is 
seen to be strongly supportive of diversity, it is easier to motivate its members to 
pursue this as an objective.  
 
Summary 
As argued elsewhere in this review, the fundamental difficulty with deciding how to 
implement programmes for change is that, despite the huge investment and effort in 
promoting such programmes, there is almost no adequate evaluative research. 
There are several reasons for this, all of which relate to the incentives and motivation 
for conducting such work. One is that organisations themselves lack the skills to 
conduct evaluations, another is that researchers (for example, psychologists) can 
publish faster, more easily and in more respected journals by carrying out 
experimental studies in controlled conditions and where adequate sample sizes are 
assured. A third is that people are too busy. They want to conduct the programme 
and proceed to other work rather than mull over the effects and implications. Or the 
people funding the programmes have moved on by the time such results might 
appear and they are more concerned to be able to say the programmes happened 
than to worry about their effects. Finally, there is the risk that effects are trivial, brief, 
null or negative, which nobody wants to be associated with, so better not to know. 
These issues will need to be tackled head-on if we are to make serious progress. 
Thus, diversity training can be effective but it needs to be informed by clear 
objectives and definable outcomes. 
 
4.4  Prejudice in childhood 
An alternative approach is to consider how prejudice develops in the first place.  
First, we have to remember that prejudice can fluctuate from situation to situation 
and, as new intergroup comparisons and conflicts occur, so prejudice shifts. 
However, it is probably also true that childhood offers a period during which deeply 
rooted prejudices can be avoided, challenged or changed. Psychologically the basis 
for this is that children have not laid down strong associations and memory traces, 
they are able to learn and unlearn more readily than adults, and it is easier to build 
up both good and bad habits in childhood. 
 
It is not uncommon to hear people describe young children as ‘innocent’, as if this 
might imply they are without prejudice. In fact, years of research in developmental 
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psychology show that prejudice appears early in childhood (see Aboud, 1988; Levy 
and Killen, 2008; Nesdale, 2001; Quintana and McKown, 2008; Rutland, 2004). This 
body of research has studied the development of prejudice in its many multifaceted 
forms and shown both age-related and contextual influences on children’s prejudice. 
These findings are important since they suggest that understanding the origins, 
functions and moderators of prejudice in children should be a high priority if we are 
to establish effective policy and combat its negative consequences. Given that 
stereotypes and prejudice are hard to change in adulthood, most psychologists 
agree that interventions must be implemented early in life to be successful  
(Aboud and Levy, 2000).  
 
Because of the changing nature of prejudice in childhood, developmental scientists 
employ a variety of methods to study children’s prejudice. Three of these are: 
children’s explicit preferences for members of their own versus other groups, 
sometimes reflected in biased judgements about the characteristics of group 
members; implicit biases; and the exclusion or rejection of individual peers in 
intergroup contexts.  
 
Explicit prejudice in childhood 
Research on children’s explicit preference for one social group over another has 
largely focused on racial or ethnic preference, with fewer studies on gender and 
national groups. Clark and Clark (1947) showed that Black American children in 
segregated schools preferred white dolls to black dolls, evidence that was influential 
in the Supreme Court case that outlawed school segregation in the United States. 
More recent techniques, including the Preschool Racial Attitudes Measure (PRAM; 
Williams, Best, Boswell, Mattson and Graves, 1975) and the Multiple-response 
Racial Attitudes measure (MRA; Doyle, Beaudet and Aboud, 1988) ask children to 
attribute positive (such as ‘clean’, ‘smart’) and negative (such as ‘mean’, ‘dirty’) 
characteristics to a white child or a black child or, in the MRA, to both children. 
Ingroup biases on these measures emerge from four to five years of age among 
ethnic majority children (for example, Aboud, 1988, 2003; Augoustinos and 
Rosewarne, 2001; Doyle and Aboud, 1995), but the biases tend to decline from 
approximately seven years of age (for example, Black-Gutman and Hickson, 1996; 
Doyle and Aboud, 1995). It is worth noting that much of this research was carried out 
in the US or Australia, but the pattern of findings is the same in the UK (for example, 
Rutland, Cameron, Bennett and Ferrell, 2005; Rutland, Cameron, Milne and 
McGeorge, 2005).  
 
An important limitation of all this research is that the evidence is typically based  
on small numbers of children (fewer than 200) within particular schools in specific 
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regions. There is very little evidence about the generality or context-sensitivity of 
children’s racial prejudice across the UK. Rutland, Cameron, Bennett and Ferrell 
(2005) conducted a small-scale national survey of children’s racial attitudes funded 
by the BBC. They found that children living in multi-ethnic and diverse areas showed 
more positive racial attitudes.  
 
Children’s attitudes to the opposite sex are usually negative between four and five 
years of age (Bigler, 1995), and this is also shown in regionally based UK research 
(Yee and Brown, 1994). However, gender biases generally do not decline from 
middle childhood onwards (Powlishta, Serbin, Doyle and White, 1994) but, rather, 
gender bias transforms and is modified by shifts in peer group activity, physical 
maturation and ideas about complementarity between genders (Abrams, 1989). 
Understanding children and young people’s gender-role assumptions (for example, 
about caring and working) should be fundamentally important for tackling various 
forms of social exclusion for both men and women. 
 
Developmental research on national prejudice, mostly conducted in the UK, also 
shows that explicit national intergroup biases appear later in childhood than racial or 
gender bias but then persist throughout middle childhood and early adolescence  
(for example, Barrett, 2007; Abrams, Rutland and Cameron, 2003; Bennett, Lyons, 
Sani and Barrett, 1998; Rutland, 1999; Rutland, Cameron, Milne and McGeorge, 
2005; Rutland, Killen and Abrams, 2010; Verkuyten, 2001). Therefore, explicit 
gender and national prejudice seems pervasive and there is a real need to 
understand the development and durability of these biases in a national sample of 
children of different ages. However, it is unclear whether (and no one has tested this) 
an all-out assault on prejudice would be a more effective strategy than dealing with 
each type of prejudice separately. Given that prejudices towards different groups 
appear to have different developmental trajectories, it seems likely that the latter 
approach might work better. 
 
Children’s implicit biases 
A few recent studies have shown that implicit biases - that is those that children 
cannot control and are not necessarily aware of - emerge early in childhood (see, for 
example, Baron and Banaji, 2006; McGlothlin and Killen, 2006; Rutland, Cameron, 
Milne and McGeorge, 2005). For example, Rutland, Cameron, Milne and McGeorge 
(2005) found that, using a child-friendly pictorial-based Implicit Association Test  
(IAT; Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz, 1998), six- to eight-year-old white British 
children showed implicit racial and national biases. The IAT measures the relative 
strength of association between concepts (for example, ‘white British’ or ‘black 
British’) and attributes (for example, ‘good’ or ‘bad’). Implicit bias was present if the 
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children show faster reaction times for stereotypical (for example, ‘white British’  
and ‘good’) than counter-stereotypical (for example, ‘black British’ and ‘good’) 
associations.  
 
McGlothin and Killen (2006) examined another indirect form of bias. They found that 
six- to nine-year-old European American children were more likely to believe there 
were negative intentions when shown an ambiguous situation where an African 
American was a potential perpetrator (for example, standing behind a swing) and  
a European American a possible victim (for example, sitting on the ground in front  
of a swing) than vice versa. Use of these indirect measures is informative because  
it can often get around language and other barriers. If we are to gauge the extent  
of children’s prejudices across equality strands it seems likely that these types of 
methods will be useful. At present there are hardly any studies of this sort globally, 
and especially in the UK. Future research should examine the relationship between 
explicit and implicit prejudice at a national level, and their respective roles in 
influencing children’s behaviour (for example, racist bullying/victimisation).  
 
Social exclusion of peers 
Another way of understanding children’s prejudices is to examine how children  
make decisions about who to include and exclude from their social relationships in 
everyday intergroup contexts (Abrams and Rutland, 2007; Killen and Stangor, 2001; 
Nesdale, 2007). Recent UK research has shown that children, adolescents and 
adults all have strong negative reactions to being excluded by peers (Abrams, 
Weick, Colbe, Thomas and Franklin, 2010) and, as children get older, they use more 
systematic strategies to enhance their group identity by psychologically embracing 
supporters and rejecting those who threaten or challenge their groups. This means 
that sometimes members of out-groups are welcomed, and sometimes members of 
in-groups are rejected. What seems especially important to children is that their own 
group’s norms are defended (Abrams and Rutland, 2008; Abrams, Rutland and 
Cameron, 2003; Abrams, Christian and Gordon, 2007; Abrams, Rutland, Pelletier 
and Ferrell, 2009. So whereas five- to seven-year-old young children prefer ‘good’ 
people over ‘bad’ people and in-group members over out-group members, older 
children prefer people who show support for their group over people who do not, 
sometimes regardless of which group those people belong to. In short, their groups 
become more than just flags of convenience: instead they become part of an identity 
to be defended.  
 
As Abrams, Rutland, Pelletier and Ferrell (2009) have shown, what seems to be 
happening is that older children have learned to expect social pressure from others  
if they do not conform, and have learned that group loyalty is valued by their peers. 
77 
 
PROCESSES OF PREJUDICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND INTERVENTION 
As they get older, children increasingly place the pressures and needs of the group 
above other considerations when making judgements about who it is right or wrong 
to exclude. This is a relatively new line of research that has primarily considered 
children’s attitudes to members of out-group nationality or schools. Thus, there is 
much to explore (for example, whether it applies in the same way across all six 
equality strands). However, it opens many doors for intervention. For example, the 
fact that it is possible to get children to be enthusiastic about individual out-group 
members shows that it should also be possible to transform their views of those  
out-groups as a whole. Future studies should include larger national samples and 
look at multiple forms of social exclusion (for example, race, ethnicity, religion, 
gender, body image, disability).  
 
Preventing prejudice in childhood 
In the UK, practitioners, educators and community workers have been very active  
in designing and implementing educational interventions to reduce prejudice in 
children. There are a number of resources available to teachers to help them plan 
and deliver classes relating to prejudice (for an example of anti-racism resources see 
www.citizenship-pieces.org.uk; for an example of lessons in the history of ethnic 
groups see www.realhistories.org.uk/). While there is a vast array of resources 
available to teachers in the UK, the content of prejudice-reduction interventions is 
often based on ‘common sense’ and intuition rather than psychological evidence 
(Stephan, 1999). By ignoring psychological theories regarding the causes and 
underlying mechanisms of prejudice and prejudice reduction, this could lead to  
poor interventions (Vrij and Van Schie, 1996) and in some cases may bring  
about an increase in prejudice and stereotyping (Vrij and Smith, 1999; Vrij and  
Van Schie, 1996).  
 
Unfortunately, many prejudice-reduction interventions are being implemented or 
have been implemented without any evaluation at all (Paluck and Green, 2009).  
In cases where interventions have been assessed, the evaluation techniques used 
are often inadequate, which limits the conclusions that can be drawn regarding the 
benefits of the intervention (Bigler, 1999). In order to ensure the interventions are 
effective and reduce prejudice in childhood, it is essential that they are based on 
psychological theory and findings and are evaluated systematically.    
 
What interventions are most successful? 
The majority of research evaluating prejudice-reduction interventions has been 
conducted in the US. Four approaches to prejudice-reduction interventions for 
children that have received the most attention are (1) multicultural curricula,  
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Multicultural curricula can include stories featuring characters from a diverse range 
of racial groups (known as multiethnic readers) or stories depicting children from 
minority racial groups in a counter-stereotypical way. There are mixed findings 
regarding how effective multiethnic readers are in reducing prejudice among  
children in the US (Levy, Troise, Moyer, Aboud and Bigler, 2003). One successful 
intervention was examined by Litcher and Johnson (1969) in the US. They evaluated 
a four-week multicultural programme that involved reading stories featuring African 
American characters. Teachers did not draw children’s attention to the ethnicity of 
the story characters and there was no discussion of race or ethnicity.   
 
Litcher and Johnson (1969) found prejudice levels were lower in the experimental 
conditions, compared to control conditions. On the other hand, a number of 
researchers have shown that multicultural interventions are ineffective and may 
indeed have a detrimental effect on intergroup attitudes. For instance, Koeller (1977) 
found that exposing 11-year-old children to stories about Mexican Americans did not 
lead to more positive racial attitudes. Furthermore, McAdoo (1970, cited in Bigler, 
1999) implemented a ‘Black Consciousness’ programme that included various 
activities, including learning songs and stories about black heroes, and reading 
stories that depict African American women and men in a positive light. This 
intervention actually led to an increase in racial stereotyping (McAdoo, 1970, cited in 
Bigler, 1999). Indeed, in their reviews of multicultural education programmes in the 
classroom, Williams and Moreland (1976) concluded that attitude modification in the 
classroom is difficult to achieve; Bigler (1999) noted that the effects of these types of 
interventions are often non-significant and are inconsistent across populations. While 
Salzman and D’Andrea (2001) found that multicultural interventions led to significant 
improvements in social interaction according to teachers’ ratings, this was not 
reflected in children’s own self-ratings. Thus, even apparently successful 
interventions can also have mixed findings.  
 
Recent research in the UK has shown that multicultural readers can be effective in 
improving white English children’s attitudes towards disabled people, refugees and 
Asian children (Cameron, Rutland, Brown and Douch, 2006; Cameron and  Rutland, 
2006; Cameron, Rutland and Brown, 2007). In a series of studies, Cameron and 
colleagues found that multicultural readers can effectively improve children’s 
attitudes towards other groups if the stories focus on cross-race friendships.  
This research has also shown that reading stories about cross-group friendships 
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improves social norms for cross-group friendship, and reduces anxiety about 
interacting with members of other groups. Multicultural books are also thought  
to be more effective if presented frequently. This is thought to increase children’s 
identification with the characters in the stories, and improve their memory for the 
stories (Slone, Tarrasch and Hallis, 2000). It also seems that multicultural readers 
may be more effective in contexts in which children have little or no other opportunity 
to meet and form friendships with actual members of other groups (Cameron, 
Rutland and Brown, 2007). 
  
Turner and Brown (2008) evaluated the impact of the Friendship Project, a 
programme in Kent designed to improve primary school children’s attitudes towards 
refugees. The programme, which consisted of four weekly classes, had three 
objectives: 1) to develop knowledge about refugees; 2) to encourage positive  
values of open-mindedness, respect for others and empathy, and 3) to develop  
new skills, for example the ability to identify similarities between people of different 
nationalities, and to detect biases, stereotypes and egocentric attitudes in oneself 
and others. Children aged between nine and 11 either received four weekly lessons 
based on the programme, or they received no lessons. All participants completed 
attitude measures before and after implementation of the programme. Half 
completed the post-test one week after completion of the programme while the other 
half completed the post-test seven weeks after its completion. The programme led to 
more positive attitudes towards refugees in the short term, but not in the long term. 
Moreover, although it did not increase empathy, the programme increased the 
proportion of participants who supported a strategy of integration (whereby refugees 
maintain aspects of their own culture, while also adopting aspects of the host 
culture); it also reduced the number of participants whose views on this conflicted 
with those of refugees. 
 
An alternative approach to classroom-based multicultural interventions involves  
the direct discussion of prejudice and discrimination (Bigler, 1999). According to  
this approach children should be encouraged to discuss racism and are taught  
ways in which to recognise and confront racism and discrimination, such as through 
the Teaching Tolerance project in the US (Aboud and Levy, 2000; Bigler, 1999; 
Derman-Sparks and Phillips, 1997; Sleeter and Grant, 1987). Like multicultural 
interventions, these interventions are based on the theoretical principle that prejudice 
is a result of ignorance, and when children are taught about prejudice, this will lead 
to its reduction. These types of interventions are often ‘TV spots’ in the form of 
extended, informative adverts, or advertisements on billboards or in newspapers and 
magazines. There is conflicting evidence regarding the effectiveness of anti-racist 
interventions. Research suggests that these interventions may actually have a 
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negative effect on out-group attitudes among adults (Kehoe and Mansfield, 1993). 
On the other hand, research with young adults suggests that alerting individuals to 
the need for improved interracial relations and increased harmony between racial 




As described earlier, psychological research suggests that intergroup contact is an 
important factor in reducing prejudice. Due to segregation within our communities,  
it is at school that children are most likely to come into contact with, and have an 
opportunity to form friendships with, people from different ethnic or racial 
backgrounds. However, children’s friendships do not always reflect the mix of  
racial groups in the classroom. Instead, children often select friends on the basis  
of social group membership, such as ethnicity or race (Aboud, 2003).   
 
Research, mainly conducted in North America, has shown that, from the age of six 
years, children and adolescents show a preference for same-race as opposed to 
cross-race friendships (for example, Aboud, 2003; Graham and Cohen, 1997).  
This preference intensifies with age; as children move through middle childhood  
into adolescence, cross-race friendships continue to decline (Aboud, 2003; Graham 
and Cohen, 1997; DuBois and Hirsch, 1990). In the US, preference for cross-race 
friendship typically begins to show a rapid decline from around age 10-12. There  
has been comparatively little research examining this issue in the UK; however, 
recent findings suggest that preference for same-race friendship appears to become 
particularly intense when children start secondary school at the age of 11 or 12  
years (Hill, Graham, Caulfield, Ross and Shelton, 2007). This gradual decline in 
cross-group friendships is particularly concerning given the potential benefits of 
cross-group friendship for increasing social cohesion and promoting good community 
relations (Laurence and Heath, 2008) and reducing prejudice (Pettigrew and Tropp, 
2006; Turner, Hewstone and Voci, 2007). Indeed, encouraging cross-group 
friendship may be one of the most effective methods by which prejudice in children 
and adults can be reduced. Further research is required to systematically examine 
(1) friendship patterns among children in the UK, and (2) what factors are driving this 
decline in cross-race friendships among adolescents in the UK.   
 
Intergroup contact interventions 
Research has shown that intergroup contact can also be used as an educational tool 
to improve children’s attitudes towards other groups. Intergroup contact interventions 
typically involve bringing together children from different social groups, for example 
white and Asian British children, or disabled and non-disabled children, who do not 
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normally get an opportunity to interact with each other (Maras and Brown,  
1996, 2000). One type of intergroup contact intervention is bilingual education 
programmes. In their review, Genesee and Gandara (1999) outlined two different 
types of bilingual education: ‘Dual-Language Education’ and ‘Immersion’. The former 
is found in the US, including the Amigos Two-Way Immersion Programme (Genesee 
and Gandara, 1999). In this model of bilingual education, children whose primary 
language is the majority language (that is, English) are educated alongside those for 
whom the primary language is the minority language. Children attend lessons taught 
in both languages. Dual-language education allows direct contact with out-group 
members and the opportunity for close intergroup cooperation in the classroom. 
Research has shown that children attending dual-language schools are less 
prejudiced towards those who speak another language, compared to all-English 
speaking schools (Cazabon, 1999, cited in Genesee and Gandara, 1999). 
 
Cooperative learning  
Maras and Brown (1996) evaluated a cooperative learning intervention that involved 
non-disabled children taking part in regular activities with disabled children. These 
activities were carefully structured so that children had to collaborate in order to 
complete the tasks. Using a sociometric preference measure, Maras and Brown 
(1996) found that children who took part in the programme expressed greater liking 
for the out-group compared to a control group. Thus, intergroup contact that involves 
cooperative learning appears to lead to positive out-group attitudes. Furthermore, in 
interventions in which the contact between the two groups was not controlled and 
cooperative interaction could not be ensured, intergroup contact interventions have 
been unsuccessful (Maras and Brown, 2000).  
 
Empathy and role-playing/perspective-taking 
Role-playing and perspective-taking are probably some of the earliest intervention 
techniques to be employed by education professionals (Aboud and Levy, 2000).  
This technique was first used with children around 50 years ago (Culbertson, 1957). 
Although it has been used as part of a number of intervention programmes (for 
example, Hill and Augustinos, 2001; Salzman and D’Andrea, 2001), it has received 
little empirical evaluation.   
 
Role-playing or perspective-taking typically involves the participant adopting the role 
or perspective of a member of a stigmatised group. Essentially, individuals imagine 
themselves in the situation of a member of the discriminated group. It is thought that, 
through this experience, individuals will adopt the perspective of a member of the 
other group and experience at first hand how it feels to be a member of that group 
and be discriminated against. The argument is that this will lead the individual to 
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empathise with members of the discriminated out-group and see themselves as 
being similar to that group: this will then lead to a reduction in prejudice because 
individuals will want to alleviate the pain and hurt of discrimination as if it were their 
own (Aboud and Levy, 2000).   
 
Perhaps the most well-known perspective-taking prejudice-reduction intervention 
was the Blue Eyes/Brown Eyes experiment (Aboud and Levy, 2000). This 
intervention was devised by Jane Elliot, an elementary school teacher in the US in 
the 1960s. She wanted to teach the children in her class how it felt to belong to a 
stigmatised group and experience discrimination. One day she told her class that 
students with blue eyes were superior to students with brown eyes and she favoured 
the blue-eyed students over the brown-eyed students. The next day she reversed 
the roles and favoured brown-eyed students. This gave students an insight into how 
it feels to be discriminated against, albeit for one day only.   
 
More recently, Byrnes and Kiger (1990) assessed the effectiveness of the Blue 
Eyes/Brown Eyes paradigm with non-black students and found the simulation 
significantly improved participants’ attitudes towards black people. Those who took 
part in the intervention were significantly more likely than a control group to confront 
discriminatory acts. However, there was no significant difference in participants’ 
social distance scores. This led Byrnes and Kiger (1990) to conclude that the 
intervention’s effects on out-group attitudes may be limited to responding to 
discriminatory acts. 
 
This finding has been replicated with children aged nine years. Weiner and Wright 
(1973) found that, compared to a control group who received no intervention, 
children who took part in a version of the Blue Eyes/Brown Eyes simulation 
expressed greater willingness to engage in an activity with the out-group (Weiner 
and Wright, 1973). Breckheimer and Nelson (1976) also found that, following role-
playing interventions, adolescents expressed a greater willingness to engage in 
cross-race activities. Furthermore, the ability to take another’s perspective and also 
the ability to reconcile their own and others’ perspectives (that is, to see others’ 
perspectives as legitimate) are linked to lower levels of prejudice in children 
(Abrams, Rutland and Cameron, 2003; Doyle and Aboud, 1995; Quintana, 1994). 
This evidence suggests that interventions based on role-playing and perspective-
taking could be effective with young children. 
 
Very little systematic research has been conducted examining the effect of  
empathy-inducing interventions, although the above findings suggest this may  
be a promising technique. 
83 
 
PROCESSES OF PREJUDICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND INTERVENTION 
Summary 
Prejudices emerge towards different groups during different periods of childhood and 
adolescence. There are well-developed methods for measuring children’s attitudes 
towards members of their own and other groups, both in terms of their explicit 
choices or statements and in terms of developing implicit associations or learning of 
stereotypes. The evidence shows that children learn negative evaluations of various 
social groups at a surprisingly young age, suggesting that combating prejudice in 
society requires early and continuous efforts to intervene. Children may exhibit 
prejudice not just through overall feelings and evaluations about groups as a whole 
but also by selectively including or excluding individual members of different groups 
from their social networks. This group-based aspect of exclusion may be especially 
worthy of attention in schools.  
 
Various intervention techniques for reducing prejudice have been tried with children 
but rarely have they been properly evaluated. There is some evidence that 
multicultural curricula can be effective, but the results are not conclusively positive. 
In the UK, multicultural readers have been found to be effective in promoting positive 
attitudes towards different ethnic groups and children with disabilities. However, 
direct discussions of racism and prejudice do not always produce the desired effects.  
 
Research shows that children in mixed-group environments do not always sustain 
intergroup contact, and may begin to self-segregate as they get older. It seems that 
the contact must involve activity that ties the groups together, such as learning one 
another’s languages or engaging in cooperative learning tasks.  
 
There is some hope that encouraging empathy and perspective-taking could reduce 
prejudice among children. However, the evidence here is not yet well established, 
and there is some evidence that children with better perspective-taking ability may 
actually be more adept at knowing how to exclude as well as include other children 
from their social networks. As well as being able to take the other’s perspective, 
prejudice reduction may depend on children being motivated to ensure members of 
other groups have a positive relationship with them.   
 
4.5 Good relations, communities and neighbourliness 
Another approach is not to worry about who is more prejudiced or less prejudiced, 
and instead to actively promote general community cohesion and generally good 
relations. For tackling salient but ‘irrelevant’ social category distinctions, this seems 
likely to be a good approach. Thus, a mixed community can best achieve shared 
goals if people do not restrict their help, or receipt of help, to those of their own 
ethnicity, gender or religion. On the other hand, the goal of simultaneously fostering 
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interindividual and intercommunity altruism may be difficult to achieve. Social 
psychological theories and evidence all point to the idea that people require a  
certain level of distinctiveness in order to experience a clear identity. This means 
differentiating their own groups and categories from others. While it might be feasible 
to get people to pull together within a community (such as a neighbourhood or city), 
it is likely to be more difficult to sustain unprejudicial responses to people from other 
communities, neighbourhoods, cities and countries if those others pose a threat or 
are in conflict. Some of the same social psychological forces that bind people 
together also serve to put them in opposition to other groups. 
 
The scope of the present review does not permit extensive discussion of community 
cohesion research. However, a review of theory and evidence on the psychology  
of neighbourliness included a definition of neighbourliness, and suggested there are 
six characteristics that need to be considered for strengthening good relations and 
neighbourliness (Abrams, 2006). Parts of these conclusions are reiterated here 
because similar principles can be applied to the concept of good relations more 
generally by substituting the geographical neighbourhood with the psychological 
concept of community. According to this idea, good relations involve: 
 
‘non-obligatory willingness to take social and practical responsibility for 
others… It may also involve the implicit presumption that there is a set 
of people who have the same willingness toward oneself. It is likely to 
be founded on a sense of common interest, common purpose and 
common identity… [it] …depends on recognition that oneself and the 
other person are part of the same entity… [it] is part of what people do 
concretely to establish and maintain that entity.’ (Abrams, 2006, p. 25). 
 
The six propositions about neighbourliness can be extended to good relations.  
First, it is useful to understand that good relations involve an orientation that may  
or may not be manifested behaviourally, depending on people’s circumstances  
and opportunity. Second, good relations are a key aspect of social inclusion  
and exclusion, and therefore will be affected by things that increase or decrease 
exclusion. Third, good relations will depend on the extent to which the participants 
are understood to be part of a meaningful entity, such as a neighbourhood, 
community, social group or network. Factors that increase the tangibility of that entity 
will also lay the ground for increased good relations. Fourth, membership of an entity 
can provide a social identity which people will value and protect through good 
relations within the entity. Fifth, groups and communities with different characteristics 
have different potential for socialisation of their members, and therefore will 
manifest good relations to different degrees. Sixth, good relations are generative. 
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For example, while neighbourly people make places neighbourly, neighbourly places 
will encourage people to be more neighbourly and to thrive as a result of stronger 
engagement with a meaningful social community.  
 
It was not possible to locate any well-evaluated intervention studies of community 
cohesion for inclusion in this review (though see earlier comments on evidence  
from Northern Ireland). It is possible to track changes in attitudes and social capital 
through surveys but it is not always easy to distinguish whether any changes reflect 
interventions in the specific community being surveyed or wider social changes.  
A project by People United, a charity that uses the arts and creativity to promote 
social cohesion, is assessing the impact of an arts-based intervention to build  
pro-social motivation across communities. However, this project is small-scale  
and still in progress. Scaling-up of such evaluated intervention projects would  
seem a desirable direction for establishing effective policy and practice. 
 
Similarly, there are substantial efforts by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and others to build intergenerational practice (see the Beth Johnson Foundation, 
London Intergenerational Network and others). However, the focus again tends  
to be on running projects rather than evaluating their efficacy or wider impacts. There 
is very little research that examines the bi-directional effects of intergenerational 
contact and activities on either intergenerational attitudes (see Abrams, Eller  
and Bryant, 2006; Kenworthy, Turner, Hewstone and Voci, 2005) or community 
relations. Therefore, it would seem useful to conduct evaluative research to test  
what works. The framework described earlier offers a system for deciding what 
should be measured. 
 
A relevant question is whether we should expect good relations to affect all 
prejudices equally. That is, whether building good relations will be a panacea for  
all prejudices, or whether it might reduce some but not others. As suggested in  
the introductory section, there are potential risks as well as advantages in building 
cohesive communities. Such communities can potentially be more exclusive and 
prejudiced. It may also be that larger cohesive communities will naturally fragment, 
resulting in potential schisms. Similarly, we need to consider whether a good 
relations approach might risk obscuring important axes of prejudice or inequality. 
That is, we may need to remain attentive to the different issues and forms of 
prejudice that might bear on different equality strands. 
 
Summary 
Good relations seem likely to revolve around a sense of mutual respect and common 
identity. Good relations could contribute to increased support for equality, respect for 
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human rights and reduced prejudice. While there are theoretical reasons for 
expecting this to be the case, there is little solid evidence of cause and effect  
and it is unclear how sustainable good relations might be in the face of other 
pressures for group identity, distinctiveness and threat. This remains an avenue  
for future investigation.  
 
4.6  Overall summary and conclusions 
This section has reviewed research that explores ways to reduce prejudice. 
Longitudinal evidence shows that intergroup contact does reduce prejudice, with 
positive effects of diversity on prejudice among majority group members. The 
evidence for minority group members is less clear. Evidence of the effectiveness  
of persuasive media campaigns is in short supply (but see Abrams, Leader and 
Rutland’s 2009 work on testing the impact of role models for black young men).  
Such campaigns risk backfiring, depending on the initial attitudes held by the people 
viewing the messages. Diversity training is also rarely well evaluated. Evidence 
suggests that it is necessary to secure a basic commitment to the goals of such 
training prior to the training.  
 
A promising avenue for interventions is to work with children and through schools. 
Prejudices towards different groups emerge at different points during childhood,  
but there is scope to influence prejudice early on. As well as focusing on broad 
prejudice it may be useful to consider instances of peer inclusion and exclusion  
that are based on group memberships. Four intervention approaches have been 
explored: multicultural curricula, intergroup contact, cooperative learning and 
empathy or perspective-taking. There is good evidence that the first two of these 
techniques work well. Evidence for cooperative learning is less clear, and there is  
not yet sufficient evidence of the effectiveness of empathy interventions to reach 
clear conclusions.  
 
Finally, the question of how good relations might fit with prejudice reduction was 
considered. Although there are some aspects of good relations that should positively 
affect prejudice, research evidence is not yet available to be sure about the mutual 
influences of these two phenomena. In sum, although there are promising prospects 
for interventions to reduce prejudice, there is a lack of systematic studies to test the 
effectiveness of such interventions and more research is required. 
 
The single clearest conclusion from this review of ways to reduce prejudice is that 
there is still very little high-quality research on the effectiveness of intervention 
techniques. Although schools, organisations and government agencies have many 
strategies for reducing prejudice and increasing good relations, the tendency is to 
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assume these will be effective simply because they have been implemented. But just 
as having a good syllabus does not ensure good learning, well-intentioned policies 
do not necessarily have the intended effects.  
 
There is strong indicative evidence that a wide range of potential techniques for 
intervention can be effective under certain conditions. However, there is insufficient 
evidence and on an insufficient scale to be able to assert what will work best and 
when. To establish this, it will be necessary to test multiple intervention strategies 
against non-intervention baselines and carefully evaluate the effects. Moreover, 
whereas much of the existing intervention work with children has tested effects 
relating to just one group or equality strand, there is very little evaluated intervention 
work that has used a cross-strand approach. It remains to be seen whether this 
would be feasible with children, or whether it will be more effective to use a strategy 
of continual interventions that rotate among equality strands. Similarly, for both 
children and adults the connection between a good relations strategy and a prejudice 
reduction strategy remains unclear.  
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
5. Conclusions and implications 
 
This review has set out what we know and do not know about prejudice in the UK, 
based on the social psychology research literature, and what we know about 
interventions to reduce prejudice, particularly among children. Despite covering over 
200 reports and reviews of (mostly experimental) academic research and theory, it 
must be acknowledged that this is not a complete record and that there is plenty of 
scope for additional focused empirical reviews. However, the present review is 
probably the most comprehensive attempted in the UK to date.  
 
The following are the major conclusions and implications from this review: 
 
1) Prejudice and good relations are not opposites. Strategies to influence 
prejudice will not necessarily affect good relations, and vice versa. In 
particular, prejudice emerges and declines as a function of changes in 
intergroup contexts and relationships. Therefore, tackling prejudice must 
begin with a coherent analysis of the intergroup context within which it arises. 
 
2)  It is useful to separate prejudice into different components. These include the 
bases of prejudice in people’s value systems, ways of categorising the social 
world, and their group-based identities. Prejudice can also be manifested in  
a variety of ways and it is useful to distinguish between different sorts of 
stereotype, different emotions, overt and more implicit or indirect prejudices, 
and prejudice that is expressed behaviourally, through language and through 
images and non-verbal means. Beyond this, people engage with prejudice  
in different ways: as a target of other people’s prejudices, by having contact 
with members of groups that might be disliked or distrusted, and through  
self-motivated or normative controls over prejudiced thoughts and actions. 
Evaluating these components provides a sound basis for assessing the nature 
and degree of prejudices relating to any equality strand. Therefore this 
framework provides a basis for a cross-strand approach to tackling prejudice. 
 
3) Efforts to understand prejudice across equality strands do not imply that 
prejudice is a generic phenomenon. Although some people may generally be 
more prejudiced than others, it is more often the case that some groups are 
targets of prejudice much more than others, or that prejudices take different 
forms depending on the group towards which they are directed. Prejudice  
can be understood as a set of common but dynamic processes that reflect 
people’s understanding of their various intergroup relationships.  
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4) Questions are currently used in UK surveys to measure some components  
of prejudice. There is a need to develop further questions for survey use, 
perhaps based on more detailed social psychology measurement scales and 
approaches. In the meantime, existing surveys need to take account of the 
strengths and weaknesses of current question wording. 
 
5) At present there is substantial laboratory-based evidence but relatively little 
field research testing the efficacy of different interventions to reduce prejudice. 
There is little informative intervention research because the outcomes of most 
interventions to reduce prejudice are rarely evaluated adequately, and most 
often they have no comparison or control conditions against which to judge 
change. If we are to tackle prejudice effectively it will be necessary to conduct 
interventions at local, regional and national levels that are evaluated against 
non-intervention baselines and comparison conditions.  
 
6) Researchers are developing promising tools for reducing prejudice, 
particularly among children. It is also known that various commonly used 
techniques can be counterproductive if applied inappropriately. These include 
direct attempts at persuasion and diversity training. On the other hand, 
facilitating positive intergroup contact, empathy and role-taking, and the use of 
multicultural curricula all offer positive prospects. Much larger longitudinal and 
intervention studies will be required before we can be confident about what 
will work best, where and when. 
 
7) To link research evidence more directly to policy formulation it is essential to 
pursue an integrated approach to prejudice and discrimination, with better 
coordination in terms of what is measured, how and when. This will allow 
firmer conclusions to be drawn about the scale, focus and nature of 
prejudices, and whatcountermeasures may be required. An integrated 
approach needs to accommodate the distinctive features and issues that 
affect different equality strands, but sustain coherence across strands in the 
way this is done. 
 
8) The framework set out in this review points towards developing a systematic 
set of measurement objectives and tools, both for evaluating prejudice across 
strands at a national level and for gauging the effects of interventions at much 
more specific local or organisational levels. These tools will need to include 
evaluation methodologies as well as common sets of measures that will 
enable firm comparisons against benchmarks and baselines. One of the 
dangers of developing such tools is that mistakes become as apparent as 
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successes. Efforts to tackle prejudice within a cross-strand framework may 
produce both, but only if we conduct high-quality evaluation can we learn from 
mistakes and build on successes.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1:  Glossary 
 
Authoritarianism Belief in absolute authority, reflected by obedience to superiors 
but tyrannical behaviour towards subordinates. 
Categorisation Assigning objects or people who vary along a continuum or 
dimension into discrete categories (for example, groups). 
Egalitarianism Belief in the principle that people should be treated as equals 
and that procedures and distributions of benefits should apply to 
all people in the same way. 
Decategorisation Disregarding the groups or categories with which people may be 
labelled and instead treating them each as unique individuals. 
Infrahumanisation The perception that a person or group is less than human, for 
example that they do not experience complex and subtle 
emotions but only basic emotions such as animals might 
experience. 
In-group  A group to which a person perceives themselves as belonging. 
Minimal group A group that people treat as an in-group but in which no 
members are identifiable and there are no prior relationships 
among the members. The group is created psychologically 
purely by categorising the person as belonging to it. 
Out-group               A group of which one is not a member and which is being 
compared with an in-group. 
Recategorisation Encompassing an in-group and out-group within a larger 
category that may include both groups. 
Prejudice Bias that devalues people because of their perceived 
membership of a social group. 
Social distance The extent to which a person feels able to have a relationship 
with another person; for example, ranging from feeling 
comfortable in sharing a neighbourhood to feeling comfortable 
having as a prospective romantic partner. 
Social identity The knowledge that one belongs to a social group together with 
the value and emotional significance of that membership. 
Stereotype A generalisation about the characteristics of a category of 
people (for example, a group). 
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Appendix 2:  Acronyms 
 
ACE  Age Concern England 
BBC  British Broadcasting Corporation 
BSAS  British Social Attitudes Survey 
EB  Eurobarometer 
EHRC  Equality and Human Rights Commission 
ESRC  Economic and Social Research Council 
ESS  European Social Survey 
GFE  Group-Focused Enmity in Europe 
NGO  Non-governmental organisation 
NSP  National Survey of Prejudice 
PRAM  Preschool Racial Attitudes Measure 
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Appendix 3:  Summary of surveys that have asked questions  






Brief description of survey 
Age Concern 
England (ACE)  
2004/6 ACE has conducted surveys, with fieldwork 
carried out by TNS (Taylor Nelson Sofres 
plc), to explore discrimination against older 
people. Two of these were directed by the 
author of this paper (see Ray, Sharp and 
Abrams, 2006; Abrams, Eilola and Swift, 
2009). The 2004 survey was the first 
national survey to use a coherent social 
psychological framework for examining age-
related prejudice. Both surveys used face-
to-face computer-aided personal interviews 
with representative samples of around 2,000 
adults across England, Scotland and Wales. 
British Crime 
Survey (BCS) 
Annual The BCS assesses perceptions and 
experiences of crime. It has a core sample 
size of around 46,000 interviews per year, 
based on the random selection of one adult 











Annual  The BHPS was an annual survey of over 
5,000 households repeated in successive 
years, and children included once they 
reached the age of 16. An additional  
survey of 11-15 year olds began at wave 4. 
The BHPS was incorporated into the 
UKHLS, itself now subsumed within the 
Understanding Society survey. This  
has a total target sample size of 40,000 
households and 100,000 individuals,  
with an ethnic minority booster sample  





Annual The BSAS includes both one-off modules 
and questions that monitor change over 
time. It involves responses from up to 3,500 
randomly selected adults within selected 
households in Great Britain. It uses a 
combination of face-to-face interviews  
and self-completion questionnaires. 
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Eurobarometer 
(EB) 
Annual The 2000 EB survey focused on attitudes  
to minority ethnic groups and included  
a sample of 1,070 in Great Britain. 
Respondents are drawn at random  




Biennial The ESS monitors social attitudes, social 
beliefs and values across Europe and how 
they change over time. It aims to achieve  
random probability samples based on full 
coverage of the household population aged 
15+ and has a sample size of 1,500 per 
participating country. The ESS consists of  
a core that is repeated on each occasion, 




Longitudinal Heim, Howe, O’Connor, Cassidy, Warden 
and Cunningham (2004) produced a report 
for GARA, describing a longitudinal 
investigation of the experiences of racism 
and discrimination by young people in 
Glasgow. This followed 271 white and  
ethnic minority young people in three 
cohorts aged 14, 17 and 20 over four  





Biennial The HO Citizenship Survey began in  
2001. Questions cover a range of issues, 
including race equality, faith, feelings about 
respondents’ communities, volunteering and 
participation.The achieved sample consists 
of around 10,000 adults in England and 
Wales (plus an additional boost sample of 





2005 The NSP was commissioned by the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)  
and subsequently reported (Abrams and 
Houston, 2006) as part of the Equalities 
Review (Cabinet Office, 2007). The survey 
was delivered through the TNS Omnibus 
Survey over a two- week period, achieving a 





2005 This repeated the Muslims variant of the 
NSP that had been conducted between  
27 of May and 1 June 2005. The survey 
provided an exact comparison one month 






Life and Times 
Survey (NILT) 
Annual NILT has been running since 1998 and  
was originally based on the Northern Ireland 
Social Attitudes Survey, itself a variant  
of the BSAS. It includes different modules 
each year. In 2008, 1,215 adults were 





Annual In 2002, the SSAS included a 40-item 
module that represented the best effort up to 
that point to apply a cross-strand approach 
to measuring prejudice and discrimination.  
It adopted many of the principles 
recommended in this review. Respondents 
were selected at random within selected 
households, with an achieved sample of 
1,665 across Scotland.  
Stonewall 2003 2003 Stonewall conducted two substantive pieces 
of research on prejudice. The first, ‘Profiles 
of Prejudice’ (2003) was a nationwide poll 
(England only) of 1,693 people aged 15+, 
conducted by MORI (Market and Opinion 
Research International, Ltd).  
Stonewall 2008  2008 In 2006, Stonewall asked young people  
from Great Britain who are lesbian, gay or 
bisexual (or think they might be) to complete 
a survey about their experiences at school 
(Hunt and Jensen, 2008). The survey 
received 1,145 responses from young 
people at secondary school. 
In 2006 Stonewall also commissioned a 
YouGov online poll of just over 2,000 adults 
to ask about perceptions of homophobia and 
attitudes towards gay, lesbian and bisexual 





Equality and Human Rights Commission Helpline
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Arndale House, Arndale Centre, Manchester M4 3AQ
Main number   0845 604 6610
Textphone   0845 604 6620 
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Scotland
Equality and Human Rights Commission Helpline
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This report reviews current knowledge about prejudice: what it is, how it might be 
measured and how it might be reduced. It focuses specifically on the equality groups set 
out in the Equality Act 2006: groups which share a common attribute in respect of age, 
disability, gender, race, religion or belief, or sexual orientation.
WHAT IS ALREADY KNOWN ON THIS TOPIC:
Many studies have examined particular aspects of prejudice and the forms it takes. n
Some surveys have included questions on the prevalence of prejudice towards  n
people from different groups. However, the extent to which questions have covered 
the relevant aspects of prejudice has varied.
Many initiatives have sought to reduce prejudice. Few, though, have been  n
systematically evaluated.
WHAT THIS REPORT ADDS:
This report draws together a wide range of social psychology literature on prejudice.  n
It takes account of: perceptions of different groups within society; the psychological 
bases for prejudice; how prejudice is expressed, and the effects of experience.
The report provides examples of survey questions that seek to measure prejudice  n
towards people from different equality groups. It discusses the value of different 
questions and highlights areas where appropriate questions have yet to be developed.
It also sets out promising ways of addressing prejudice. n
